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Abstract
This document constitutes the first deliverable of MAFTIA work
package 1. The objective of this work package is to define a consistent
framework for ensuring the dependability of distributed applications in
the face of a wide class of threats. In particular, the aim is to develop a
coherent set of concepts for an architecture that can tolerate
deliberately malicious faults, such as intrusions, in applications
distributed over the Internet. The intrusions of concern include not
only those perpetrated by external penetrators, but also those carried
out by corrupt insiders, i.e., users who are authorized to access the
system but not authorized for the accessed data, program or resource,
and administrators who misuse their rights. Although intrusions are the
primary class of targeted faults, the architecture should also be
adequately robust towards accidental physical faults and accidental
design faults.
Keywords
Dependability, Security, Fault-tolerance.
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Chapter 1 Scenarios and Use Cases
1.1 Introduction
J. Dobson, R. J. Stroud, University of Newcastle upon Tyne (UK)
This chapter contains a number of scenarios and use cases that are informed by the
members of the Industrial Advisory Board and the experience of project members
themselves. The first scenario is concerned with the issue of industrial espionage and
illustrates the many ways in which an Illegal Information Broker can obtain
confidential information about a target company. The second scenario is based on
marine transportation, and highlights some of the complex accountability issues that
can arise when the chain of dependencies in a commercial transaction involves
multiple organisations working across international boundaries. The third scenario
discusses some of the problems of securing a corporate intranet for a large
multinational company. The fourth scenario is concerned with the issue of privacy for
mental health records, and the fifth scenario argues that the traditional attributes of
security (confidentiality, integrity and availability) need to be extended with a notion
of auditability in order to address legal concerns about accountability and proof when
deploying a nation-wide electronic healthcare system. Two further scenarios deal with
the problems of setting up a fair and trustworthy electronic market place for e-
commerce, and the security issues involved in allowing communication of sensitive
information between an aircraft and its airline company.
It should be noted that these scenarios are not intended to be a scientific contribution
of the project, nor have they been analysed in order to derive specific requirements for
the project. Instead, their purpose is to motivate discussions within the project on
information security issues and models that are applicable to a wide class of
applications in various kinds of organisations.
There are two organisational contexts in which the security mechanisms in a
computer system need to be considered. The first is one of re-engineering: new
technology means that more efficient or effective mechanisms can be put in place
either in an existing system or in a new system that is an incremental adaptation of an
existing system whose engineering is well-understood. The second context, which is
much less frequent and much more painful, is re-institutionalisation: an organisation
needs to re-invent itself, perhaps in response to changes in the market, or perhaps
because the impact of new technology is so fundamental that the old assumptions no
longer apply and so incremental adaptation is not an adequate response.
These two contexts are very different in almost every respect, but the one we want to
focus on here is the relationship between policies (in particular, security policies but
the discussion is more general than that) and mechanisms. In a context of re-
engineering, the policies are more or less unchanged (and indeed, the stability of
policy is constitutive of re-engineering), so that the policies still govern the choice of
mechanism, a choice which is being re-evaluated.
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In contrast, the relationship between policies and mechanisms changes completely in
a context of re-institutionalisation. Here, the need to choose mechanisms creates a
demand for policy: a demand that often cannot be fulfilled because, until the re-
institutionalisation is more or less underway, it cannot be known what the policies are.
It is almost always premature to assume that the policies conceived at the beginning
of a re-institutionalisation process will be the most appropriate ones once the process
is complete.
It follows that the choice of mechanisms and the relationship of this choice to policy
is quite different in the two cases. In the first, it is simply an engineering decision:
will these mechanisms implement this policy? But in the second case, the question is
often: what is the range of possible policies that need to be supported? This becomes
an architectural question.
It would be naïve to think that the technologist has no role in the architectural
discourse. However, the role is not to remain silent until the policy is decided and
then implement the decision. Rather, the role of the technologist is to inform as to
technological possibility and to suggest alternatives that are feasible. For example, a
re-institutionalisation may well be raising a requirement for a more fluid definition of
role, with its attendant difficulties for a role-based access control security policy. The
security technologist could contribute to the discourse by explaining the possibilities
afforded by an approach based on an information flow model rather than a role-based
model.
But of course the role of the technologist as informant in a policy debate differs from
the technologist’s role as implementer of a pre-defined policy. To be effective in the
former role, the technologist needs to know how to transform the rhetoric of policy
into a form that is suitable as input into an engineering process. This requires a way of
formalising the language of policy, which often involves concepts such as role,
responsibility, communication, ‘need-to-know’ and so on. One approach to this issue
of formalisation is presented in Sections 3.7 and 3.8 of this deliverable, and will be
further developed during the project.
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1.2 Orchestrated Information Attacks
D. Long, CISA Ltd (UK)
1.2.1 Introduction
The need to obtain information is driven by many factors and its acquisition may lead
to success in wealth, war, power, and capital. The capabilities of organisations
dedicated to finding and processing information can be extraordinary and the amount
that they will invest can be considerable, as the rewards for a single transaction of the
correct information magnitude can be millions. One of the most significant changes to
occur in relation to information in the past two decades is that information that was
previously within the domain and protection of the State, has now, under the
information explosion and the free market economy, become accessible to individuals
or groups dedicated to acquiring information, manipulating data or denying others
legitimate access.
Throughout history there has been a cadre of those who would collect information
gathered for one purpose and fuse or meld it with other data, in order to achieve
personal or organisational advantage. The legitimacy of this is a matter of perception.
Undertaken for research, combining information in this way can be viewed as a major
benefit to society. Used by the Police for the detection and prosecution of crime, such
actions are also acceptable. However, it would probably be considered unacceptable
for the same information to be accessed in the same manner by a private detective
agency, information broker or foreign intelligence organisation.
1.2.2 The Information Broker
We are now seeing the rise of the Information Broker (IB) as an Information
Assurance threat. Prior to the IT age, an IB provided market research services to
business and industry via the capturing and collation of information from media,
official registers of companies, annual reports, economic surveys, etc.
In the IT age we now see the industrial IB moving towards searching both public and
private databases. Throughout both periods, the unscrupulous have operated in the
public and private domains to obtain sensitive information of value. Thus IB is a term
that includes a wide variety of activity. It can be an entirely proper business activity
but it can also involve:
•  An organisation that sets out to obtain information – or influence - through
agents, and then trades that onward, sometimes for corrupt purposes.
•  Individuals, or opportunists acting on their own who might also trade
information and influence often gained innocently as a result of the naïve
attitude of staff and/or poor control procedures.
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1.2.3 The Broker as a Potential Protagonist
An Illegal Information Broker (IIB) may be:
•  An opportunistic individual working alone.
•  An individual co-ordinating and using others.
•  A trading organisation, perhaps offering consultancy services with a network
of agents who develop company insiders.
An IIB frequently targets large industrial organisations to take advantage of
imprudent company contacts. Frequently they seek to penetrate projects and the
contract process by developing relationships with relevant personnel and might use
bribery, blackmail or social recruitment. They will also seek to gain access
electronically and remotely via the Web into the corporate Intranets and thence to
critical domains within the company structure.
The IIB seeks to obtain and then trade:
•  Influence, usually bid lists, evaluations, scope of work etc.
•  Information, mainly tenders, procurement, budgets, new formula and business
critical IPRs.
Frequently the IIB is an ex-member of the sector or actual organisation using
specialist knowledge to target and identify the specific ‘information gems’ that will
bring the most gain when offered to the market.
In late 1999, a review of the web revealed 135 advertisements on one site alone for
‘Information Broker’ services. Mainly based in the US and Europe (Switzerland) they
offered various services but all related to the ability for them to gain access to
databases such as Social Security, Court records, Credit Card information, etc. This
would indicate that IIBs have followed the trend towards IT database consolidation
and are ‘harvesting’ these new sources. The New York Times reported that a Social
Security Clerk could receive $25 for an item of database information that would be
retailed by an IIB for $300.
In addition to the targeted recruiting or coercion of sources within companies, a
further recent trend has been the exploitation by IIBs of Hackers. Frequently the
Hacker is unaware of the manipulation that is occurring, as he is in dialogue over the
Internet with the IIB who appears to be another Hacker, usually of apparently greater
skills. The Hacker is set challenges or tasks by the IIB, and accepts them as a
technology challenge. The resulting break-in methodology or information gained is
then passed to the IIB as proof of success. In due course, this may lead to receiving
rewards or indeed ‘funded commissions’ from the IIB. The use of this method is on
the increase, as it reduces the risk that the IIB will be exposed or entrapped during the
normal recruitment period, which is when the IIB is at greatest risk should the attempt
fail. The use of the Web provides both speed and anonymity for recruitment, targeting
and information dissemination.
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A company may be the target of an IIB for several reasons:
•  Perhaps as a major purchaser of vehicles, hardware & software systems,
stationary etc., the contracts may be lucrative and the knowledge of
opponent’s bids or the win price is high value.
•  Information on new IPR investments, new partnerships etc. can be highly
valuable to the other market players.
•  If a corporation handles client information, knowledge of those clients, their
requirements and business or State operations is valuable.
The IIB is unlikely to wish to achieve anything other than a Confidentiality attack, but
his methods can also be used by those who are members of extremist pressure groups.
The true IIB seeks information that may be resold or meets a commission’s specific
needs, the extremist may also attempt to cause damage or service/system denial. In
extreme circumstances, Integrity may be affected if the IIB is able to change a
contract price/budget but that is highly unusual.
1.2.4 Scenario
An IIB is approached at a Conference and asked to provide some deep background
information on a new .com company such as its budget, technical performance,
numbers of ‘hits’ per day, system suppliers, business plan for the stock release, stock
options held, etc. For example:
• is this new venture being supported by banks?
• which international corporations are using the system?
• is there a possibility that a future tie-up may be made with key ISPs?
The IIB sets in place a comprehensive, overlapping plan to obtain the information and
validation via a multiple set of activities and contacts. The first objective is to find out
more information on the whole operation, the types of business that are being sought
and the methods used. The IIB notes from the press that the target is making strong
inroads into its chosen market and that there appears to be no equal supplier. Rumour
abounds that the target may be sold to an established Web company and consolidated
into its existing business. The IIB makes plans to find out details concerning the sale,
and approaches a known university graduate who is willing to act as an insider. The
graduate applies to an Agency that supplies staff to the Information Support helpdesk
of the target company. With some false records provided by the IIB, the graduate is
hired and starts work. From the inside, he is able to monitor and build up the network
design of the company. The team appreciate his skills and after some manoeuvring he
moves to assist the Technical Design Architect in some support solutions for the roll-
out – if the bid goes through. As part of the forward business plan core team he has
access to details of the company’s size, future developments, abilities and targets. The
graduate also acts as a ‘talent spotter’ for the IIB and highlights some team members
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who are short of funds or who have personal problems that can be exploited. These
are followed up and in turn these contacts volunteer names of others. Using other
previous contacts in Telecommunication companies and specialist web software, the
IIB will also insert electronic access gateways into the internal telephone exchange for
modem dial-in and software ‘holes’ that provide exploitation points. Each is disguised
to look like a legitimate remote user, whilst the network monitoring devices are
disabled by the insider.
As a backup, the IIB arranges for the waste-bags from the company to be dropped off
in nearby bushes for collection and sorting.
Using multiple identities on various European and South American web sites, the IIB
uses the bulletin boards and chat lines to see if any technical chat or financial trading
tips are being traded about the companies. On occasions he will stimulate debate by
making provocative statements and reviewing the response. Electronic dialogues
develop over the globe from the original ‘net-chats’.
Given some of the basic information from the ‘insider’, the IIB begins to set
‘challenges’ to hackers on the dedicated Boards. In turn, some are caught but a few do
succeed and post their success, methods and information gleaned. The IIB logs this
and uses the results to refocus his efforts or validate information gained though
conventional methods.
The IIB turns his attention to the company’s suppliers; using both electronic attacks,
deception telephone calls, and insiders he seeks to find out what contracts are being
placed, and the dates and delivery times of new equipment that support the company
expansion and which might be used by the new owner. By posing as an employee or
as a sub-supplier, this method provides a backdoor into future technological
expansion and aids corporate valuation.
In time, a set of contacts in the key business areas, usually at the PA/Secretarial level
is used to collect information. On occasions, these contacts download information
onto discs to be smuggled out. A few Sales staff and Technical support staff will
freely provide information to those who they see as friends (or potential new
employers if they think they might be made redundant during the forthcoming
takeover).
The IIB can provide the information requested but now has additional information on
contract win prices, tips for stock-market investments but more importantly a
portfolio of contacts who can be reactivated and used for other purposes and needs in
the future. The original request for information may have been legitimate but by
passing the objective down the chain, more illegal methods have come into operation.
The IIB will use ‘open source’ commercial information to build his attack plan and
identify the more difficult areas where key information is held. He may even
commission a commercial marketing intelligence report or front such an organisation.
The IIB will use multiple methods to gain access. Where possible he would use a
country that had weak laws in prosecuting such activities. A blend of physical contact,
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an insider, and remote electronic access is still the most reliable method of capturing
information.
1.3 Intelligent Transport Systems
D. Long, CISA Ltd (UK)
1.3.1 Introduction
This scenario is related to a new EU eEurope initiative on “Intelligent Transport
Systems”. In “An Information Society For All”, the following problem is identified:
“Maritime transport safety is hampered by lack of information and
requires closer identification and monitoring of traffic along the coasts
of Member States, in particular, of ships carrying polluting goods”2.
1.3.2 Scenario
A Greek registered container ship enters European waters from the Atlantic and
proceeds to Felixstowe in Suffolk. On board are 1200 mixed containers, 400 of which
are to be unloaded at Felixstowe before the vessel collects 300 containers and moves
onto Hamburg. The Master has a loading plan, Felixstowe has a master list of
containers, and contents and position. The loading port (New Orleans) had prepared
bills of lading that are also held in databases. HM Customs & Excise have the bills of
lading sent to them for processing by their system, CHIEF.
Certain containers are listed as containing ‘hazardous cargo’ and these are stored with
due security.
At Felixstowe the containers are unloaded and stacked on the dock. Lorries arrive to
load and collect containers, which then leave by road for distribution throughout the
UK. Hazardous containers are marked and the lorries display the correct agreed EU
hazardous warnings for the Emergency Services.
Due to a failure of the software or malicious interference by a ‘Green Group’, the
electronic record identifying a particular hazardous container gets lost. The lorry
transporting the container is involved in an accident whilst passing through a built-up
area. The Emergency Services, unaware of the cargo within the container, use the
wrong chemicals to contain a fire and the whole incident rapidly accelerates out of
control.
                                              
2
  “An Information Society For All”, the Draft Action Plan prepared by the European
Commission for the European Council in Feira 19-20 June 2000, under the section entitled
“Intelligent Transport Systems” on page 26.
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2.3.3 Trust Model
The system that should have marked the container as hazardous has had to interact
from transhipment in the US, to New Orleans Port Authority, through US Customs,
the Shipping Agent, the Master, UK Customs, Felixstowe Port, and road transport. All
these organisations have had to have secure, reliable e-commerce interaction to ensure
that the right information is passed around the international private/government chain.
Communications bearers are required, the software applications have to accept the
right ‘formats’, and ‘trust’ is required at every level throughout a mixed judicial
environment.
2.3.4 Analysis
The security model for this application is unclassified but commercially sensitive. The
threats and risks to the application are accidental loss of information, unintentional
changes, and malicious faults. Contingency plans in the event of a malicious attack
from an intruder or corrupt insider are minimal, due to the international chain of
organisations involved in the transaction. Fault tolerance mechanisms exist but only in
basic form. For example, electronic tagging of individual containers and GPS tracking
does occur but is expensive. This is very much a ‘belt and braces’ approach. The
dependability of the system is really only concerned with ‘availability’ in order to
keep traffic flowing, and the prevention of incidents further down the delivery chain is
regarded as being out of scope.
2.4 Information Systems in Mental Health
J. Dobson, University of Newcastle upon Tyne (UK)
2.4.1 Introduction
The issue of confidentiality and invasion of privacy has become increasingly
prominent as the use of computers becomes widespread. The importance of individual
privacy has long been recognised in a democratic society. Specific laws and
regulations, such as privacy and freedom of information acts, have been introduced to
assure and safeguard individual rights. However, the issues involved in protecting
these rights when using a computerised database system have not been clearly
understood. In order to illustrate some of the problems, a case study based on mental
health care is presented. The goal is not so much to define a security policy for this
application area as to highlight some of the issues that such a policy should address.
2.4.2 Confidentiality and Privacy Issues in the Mental Health Profession
The confidence and trust between the patient and doctor is an important concern
within the medical profession and healthcare system. Maintaining confidentiality of a
patient’s medical data is of great importance. This issue is particularly sensitive in a
mental health delivery system and has become a controversial topic when
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computerised information systems are being considered to handle mental health data.
It is the fear of many medical professionals that the confidentiality of medical and
personal data will not be maintained. Such a fear is not totally unsupported.
The current scenario envisages that a proposal has been made for the development of
an information system that can provide the needed information and data to improve
the quality and efficiency of mental health care delivery in a Regional Health
Authority. The Authority has only limited resources available but is responsible for
using those resources effectively and efficiently in the development and management
of a system-wide mental health delivery system. The Authority’s staff will use the
system to gather planning data about individuals who need mental health care in order
to develop a system of mental health care facilities that reflects the patterns of the
mental health patient population. Information may also be available for supporting
medical, psychological, and social studies, and for monitoring possible epidemic
situations. All these functions may have opportunities for the compromise of the
required confidentiality and for the invasion of a patient’s privacy.
The responsible administrator and technical staff have repeatedly assured the mental
health community that the proposed information system will provide adequate
controls for the protection of confidentiality and individual privacy as demanded by
regulations and ethical standards of the medical profession. However, their confidence
has not been shared by the mental health professionals.
Information and data recorded in the patient’s medical records are subject to many
potential abuses. A patient needs confidence in his or her doctor in order to build a
trust for obtaining appropriate and quality medical attention and care. Patients with
mental health problems are particularly vulnerable. The simple fact of seeking mental
health care can have potential abuses in many organisational, political, and social
circumstances. Mental patient records often contain sensitive private and confidential
data about certain organisations or other individuals that could but should not be
shared by others. Basic requirements for handling patient records have been
established, rigidly stated, and are compulsory by laws and organisational regulations.
On the other hand, there are organisations and individuals that are directly and
indirectly related to the patient mental health care process or to the patient, and have
certain legitimate needs to access relevant information from the patient’s record.
These individuals include medical support personnel such as nurses, pharmacists,
social workers, medical administrative staff, insurance agents, patients’ relatives and
legal guardians, mental health systems administrators, researchers, and law
enforcement officials who are responsible for protecting the patient and the public.
They all have justifiable needs for accessing a patient’s medical or personal data for
fulfilling their professional, legal, and/or moral responsibilities. Relationships
between these individuals are complicated. The conditions under which they are
permitted to access information are not clearly understood and issues related to these
conditions are often emotional, controversial and ambiguous. To have a clear
understanding of these conditions is an extremely difficult task.
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Confidentiality and individual privacy issues have not been taken seriously by many
administrators. Their main responsibilities and concerns are economical, particularly
operating costs. Many of them do not have a full appreciation of confidentiality and
privacy issues and have a very limited understanding of the technical limitations of
information and data security. Thus, although the power of computerised information
systems has been recognised by many mental health administrators, proposals for
using computers to increase the efficiency and quality of mental health delivery
systems have often been made without a clear understanding of the potential
information security implications and consequences.
The issues of confidentiality have also not been fully comprehended by computing
professionals. The semantics of information security requirements when using a
computerised database system have not been understood by computing professionals.
Most database security researchers and developers have only just begun to appreciate
the problem.
The most difficult concern is that administrators and computing professionals have
not been given the legal, ethical, and moral responsibility for information security.
They have not been held legally liable and there is no law to require them to do so.
2.4.3 Information Security Demands
In this section, the information security requirements and demands in a mental health
delivery system are briefly presented and analyzed. The analysis is by no means
complete or absolutely accurate. The characteristics of these mental health security
demands are identified along with some possible approaches or suggestions for the
computerisation of mental health information systems. These characterisations and
suggested approaches are presented for the purpose of stimulating discussions. They
should not be viewed as formal research results from a well-formed analysis or
investigation.
2.4.3.1 Information Security Focuses on the Meaning of the Data
Information security focuses more on the meaning of the data instead of the data
itself. Security systems that process classified data assume that sensitive data is the
valuable resource to be protected. Information security systems concern mainly the
functions and interests of the application and its organisation. Information security
functions and features must be developed within the domain of the application data
model. The database user’s application level responsibility plays an important role in
information access and control. Access to information should not just be based on the
trustworthiness of the user but more on the user’s need for information in order to
perform the assigned application functions.
2.4.3.2 Application-dependent Security Constraints
A security policy must be developed as an integral part of the application. The
information security semantics must reflect data semantics germane to the application
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and relevant to the role of the user who performs data access tasks. An application
system is considered secure if it provides the needed information to a legitimate user
for accomplishing application objectives and prevents individuals from the
unauthorised access of information. Application-dependent security constraints are
often complicated. They are frequently dependent upon the contents of several data
items and the context of the database structure. Certain constraints are time- or event-
dependent. The data access control may have a temporal relationship to the status of
some events or time-dependent data values.
2.4.3.3 A User-role Based and Action Oriented Information Security Approach
In a mental health information system, the control on who can access what
information is an important feature. The emphasis on the user-role and data access
actions within the application domain is essential. The user’s need for information and
its permitted data access actions are the main factors that determine the allowable data
access operations.
Only authorised users should be allowed to access data. Based on their roles, all users
must have predefined information access rights. Changes to the state of the data must
be due to authorised actions that carry out data access operations on certain
permissible data sets as specified in the user’s access rights. All actions are traceable.
Individuals in medical and related professions have specific legal and moral
responsibilities in accessing and maintaining patients’ medical records. An
individual’s data access rights are often dependent upon his or her relationship with
other medical personnel or the appearance of certain values such as permission. The
authorised data access rights are often content- and context-dependent. The
development of appropriate techniques for handling these types of access controls is
certainly a non-trivial task.
2.4.3.4 Only Authorised and Registered Users are Allowed to Access Mental Health
Information
The computerised mental health information system has inherited legal and
professional responsibilities of medical professionals for maintaining patients’
confidentiality and privacy. The system has to be designed to allow access only by
authorised and registered users.
However, what are the legal and professional responsibilities of computer and systems
staff who have the opportunity to access data, and how are these to be defined and
developed? What mechanisms can be used to ensure that they, and only they, take the
actions necessary to discharge these responsibilities?
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2.4.3.5 Traceability of Data Access Activities
Traceability on activities of generation and use of the data may be required for the
enforcement of an individual user’s accountability as required by laws and regulations
in mental health delivery.
The system must be able to maintain a trace of data access activities. The trace should
be able to tell who generated and accessed what information, and when such an action
took place in order to determine individual users’ legal and professional
responsibilities. How can such an auditing procedure be effectively designed? Can the
auditing process itself contribute to the potential of the invasion of privacy?
2.4.3.6 Temporal Controls may be Necessary
Granting permission to permit certain information access by a patient or medical
personnel implies the need for temporal logic and control. A data access action to be
executed may depend on the value of a temporally varying variable (e.g. the patient’s
age ‡  18) or the appearance of a given event (e.g. the doctor’s confirming signature).
The precedence relationships between various types of events will have to be used to
form temporally related control systems. A doctor’s reporting obligations may trigger
a sequence of activities. These chained activities will require the security system to
have certain propagation transaction controls and will require the use of rollback
techniques in the event that it fails to complete the anticipated activities. The
development of temporal entities and temporally related information security access
control is another difficult but very intriguing task.
2.4.3.7 Information Flow Control Problems
The chained activities involve much more than just a simple information flow. At
each stage the system must interpret the meaning of the information flow in order to
take an appropriate next step. For example, when a parent attempts to access a
patient’s data, the system must determine if the patient’s permission is needed. This
depends on the patient’s age and whether the doctor thinks the patient is capable of
making such a decision. The system also has to determine that the individual
attempting to access the data is indeed the parent of the patient. The system has to
take an appropriate action at each step. Understanding the meaning and consequences
of the information flow is a difficult research task. Are recently developed AI
techniques and knowledge-based systems concepts helpful in this regard?
2.4.3.8 Verifying the Source of the Information
When the system requires certain information, it must also verify that the appropriate
authorised individual generated the information. For example, how does the system
know that permission is indeed given by the patient or the doctor? An individual may
deny having accessed certain information - how can the system prove whether or not
the individual is telling the truth? Can electronic signature techniques be applied to
solve this problem in a mental health information system?
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2.4.3.9 Data Accuracy and Completeness Problems
Although doctors are required to maintain an accurate and complete patient record,
there are no valid legal and technical means to ensure accuracy and completeness of
information. Is this an open problem?
2.4.3.10 Inference and Aggregation Problems
The control of inference and aggregation issues in mental health information systems
is a common problem that is encountered in all statistical database systems.
Appropriate means for controlling illegal inferences and deductions must be
introduced to reduce possible damages.
Different types of statistical studies have different data access characteristics and
needs. Inference control experts must examine each proposed study in order to
determine what inference control techniques are to be used. This is not something that
can be automated by the system.
2.4.3.11 Applicability of Multi-level Security to Mental Health Information
Systems
The need to protect different levels of sensitive information is not unique to a mental
health system. There are similarities with corporate management information systems
that must protect proprietary and market sensitive information, and systems that
process classified data in military applications. However, the existing military
classification system may not be directly applicable to mental health delivery systems.
Different levels of clearance may have to be assigned to different types and levels of
medical, administrative, and technical personnel.
Can the existing principles and concepts of multi-level security systems be made
applicable to mental health information systems? Can a partially ordered classification
system be appropriately developed for controlling the sensitive information in a
mental health information system?
2.5 Multinational Intrusion Detection Systems
M. Dacier, IBM Research, Zurich (CH)
In today’s world, the economy is global and many companies have a global presence
too. The Internet offers simple ways to create world-wide virtual private networks that
link all the sites of a given company together. Enforcing security within such a
distributed and, frequently, heterogeneous environment is a difficult task. In addition
to the usual techniques for preventing intrusions, such as firewalls and packet filters,
intrusion detection systems are now also becoming part of the security officer’s
toolbox.
Initially these systems were fairly simple, focusing on the “outside” border of the
network, looking for intrusions originating from the Internet. However, with the
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growing demand for sophisticated services to enable e-commerce, back-end systems
are less and less confined to the secure “Intranet”. Indeed, the notions of Intranet and
Extranet are fading out. As a consequence, the number of intrusion detection sensors
is increasing because such sensors now have to be deployed in what used to be seen as
the ‘secure Intranet’. They not only have to be placed at different locations but they
also need to use different technologies in order to cope with the kind of system they
are supposed to protect. This proliferation of sensors generates several problems that
are typical of large scale distributed applications and which, so far, have not been
addressed appropriately. In the next few paragraphs, we will try to outline an idealised
scenario for the deployment of a large-scale intrusion-detection system.
It is not our intent to be exhaustive in listing the various problems that have to be
solved. On the contrary, we limit ourselves to a few examples of things that, in a real-
world and concrete example, need to be addressed.
In our scenario, the intrusion detection system is supposed to protect a large number
of sites, located in different countries. The term “site” denotes a, potentially,
complicated network. For economical reasons, the people in charge of security are
centralized in one location. In order to achieve their work efficiently they need to be
able to:
i) Remotely manage all the intrusion detection software at every site (i.e. install,
start, stop, configure, etc.).
ii) Verify that, at any point in time, the integrity of these sensors has not been
violated.
iii) Collect all the alarms generated by all sensors in a central location.
iv) Do some reasoning based on the alarms received, using a correlation engine.
v) Launch countermeasures in case of attacks.
It should be clear from this list of requirements that there is a need for secure
information communication between the centralized system where correlation takes
place and all the sensors, distributed in every site. One could imagine using Virtual
Private Networks (VPNs) between each sensor and the correlation engine. However,
in our example, the security officer cannot restrict his or her view to the threat caused
by the outsider. A large multinational company may be employing many contractors,
with “trusted” connections to several other companies in order to run its business.
Furthermore, some of the company’s sites may have outsourced part of their
infrastructure or have it remotely managed by some specialized company. For all
these reasons, the “insider” threat is of high importance and the security officer may
have deployed several hundreds of intrusion detection sensors in each site or perhaps
even installed simple intrusion detection probes on each desktop machine. Therefore,
it is quite likely that sensors will very frequently be added and removed from every
site. Using classical and rather static VPNs in such an environment is doomed to fail.
This highlights the need for more sophisticated means to communicate between the
sensors and the correlation engine. A solution has to be found that can deal with this
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changing set of sensors in an efficient and scalable way. Secure group membership
and group key exchange protocols provide one possible solution that will be explored
by the MAFTIA project.
Also, this scenario indicates that the system where correlation takes place is itself a
single point of failure. If an insider can control it, the whole intrusion detection
system becomes useless. One way of avoiding this problem is for the correlation
service to be distributed across several platforms that each receives all the alarms
from all the sensors. This probably requires some form of secure and ordered
multicast protocol. Last but not least, these correlation engines should eventually
report their conclusion to the security officer in a consistent way. This requires the use
of some form of voting protocol since we assume that some of the correlation engines
could have been corrupted.
This example is intriguing in the sense that it presents a large-scale internet
application that requires the technology the MAFTIA project is about to work on but,
at the same time, the application itself is something that will be investigated and is
needed to protect other applications. We have here some form of recursion. MAFTIA
technology is being used to support MAFTIA technology, and this scenario is best
described by the term “intrusion-tolerant large-scale intrusion-detection”.
2.6 Healthcare Information System Security
G. Trouessin, CESSI (F)
2.6.1 Introduction
Information System Security (ISS) has been historically viewed as IT security, in
other words the combination of the usual Availability, Integrity and Confidentiality
properties. However, more recently, the definition of Healthcare Information System
Security (HISS) has been broadened to include the juridical-technical concepts of
Auditability; first, for legal and privacy reasons, but also to enable some convergence
with potential safety and reliability needs.
For this reason, defining, applying and verifying security is not considered to be
enough by most responsible health actors involved in serious healthcare projects.
Auditability is seen as a sort of juridical-technical bridge between pure legislation
such as legal rights and obligations, and pure technical solutions such as digital
signatures (as opposed to the more recent electronic signature).
As these systems are considered by human rights, health and life preservation
organisations, the challenge of providing HISS is that it embraces privacy, reliability
and safety; increasingly, HISS must be provided over a multimedia network dedicated
to medical activity, say a Health Information Network (HIN).
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2.6.2 Typical Scenarios
2.6.2.1 The Medical Scenario (tele-medicine):
A patient and their General Practitioner (GP) communicate about the results of a test
and a draft diagnosis. There is an off-line consultation between the GP and another
GP, video-advice from a specialist in another country, and a final decision as to
whether to proceed with a surgical operation or not.
What for? high confidentiality and integrity, and actor authentication
Why? deontology/code of practice and privacy
How? authorisation, encryption and digital/electronic signature
When? over the HIN when transporting sensitive personal data and
availability during the remote consultation
2.6.2.2 The HealthCare Scenario (electronic reimbursement claim)
Ensuring that a patient is reimbursed by the social security agency for the payment the
patient has made to his GP for a series of consultations, tests, and a referral to a
specialist.
What for? confidentiality and integrity, and organisational authentication
Why? medical-administrative secrecy (confidentiality); electronic evidence
of the reimbursement claim and financial high integrity and
accountability
How? authentication, encryption, non-repudiation
When? on the GP’s hard disk, in the healthcare insurance computer and
during the transport of the electronic reimbursement claim
2.6.2.3 The SocialCare Scenario (electronic benefit claim)
The costs of providing hospital care for an unemployed member of a disadvantaged
family are paid for out of Social Security funds. Anonymised statistics about the
provision of such benefits are gathered nationally for analysis and to inform policy.
What for? confidentiality and integrity, and organisational authentication;
confidentiality-anonymity for statistical studies
Why? administrative secrecy (confidentiality) and financial high integrity
and accountability
How? authentication, encryption, non-repudiation; anonymisation (one-
way function) processes
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When? in the social institution’s computers and during the transportation of
the electronic reimbursement (from the social security to the bank
organisation)
2.6.3 Analysis
The Medical scenario The HealthCare scenario The SocialCare scenario
Needs
IT security: ISS
Availability high low medium
Integrity yes yes yes
Confidentiality secrecy privacy privacy
Health security: HISS
Auditability medical evidence financial/administrative
evidence
financial evidence
Dependability
Reliability high (for high availability) network network
Safety emergency / surgery
Maintainability for the GP devices yes yes
Usability yes yes yes
…
Means
Sub-objectives
Dependable middleware high importance medium importance medium importance
Intrusion detection high importance strong importance strong importance
Distributed authorisation high importance medium importance low importance
Dependable TTP certification-TTP and
confidentiality-TTP
certification-TTP certification-TTP
2.6.3.1 What are the Contingency Plans in the Case of Malicious Attacks?
Confidentiality-secrecy: a priori robust encryption.
Confidentiality-seclusion: a priori irreversible anonymisation.
Integrity: usual security and dependability techniques.
Availability: network availability essentially.
2.6.3.2 Utility of Mechanisms
Fault-and-intrusion-tolerant atomic transactions, intrusion detection, trusted third
parties (TTPs) and distributed authorisation schemes are useful for all three scenarios.
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In particular, authenticity can be provided by certification-TTPs and availability by
confidentiality-TTPs. Fault- and intrusion- tolerant group communication and
consensus protocols are useful in the first scenario, particularly in the case where
remote advice is received from more than two agents. The matrix above shows in
more detail how these mechanisms can be used as the means of achieving the security
needs of each application scenario.
2.7 E-Procurement Application
D. Horne, Tradezone (UK)
2.7.1 Introduction
The following scenarios are taken from Tradezone e-procurement workflows where
the issues addressed by MAFTIA, fault- and intrusion- tolerance for large-scale
Internet applications, are, or might be, of importance.
The overall application domain of Tradezone has the following characteristics:
• Electronic purchasing of goods and services that can either (a) be represented
in catalogue form (i.e., definable product types and attributes), or (b) can be
defined by a request for quotation / tender workflow.
• A domain with three principal actors (see Figure 1):
• Purchasers – individuals and corporate groups of individuals
requisitioning, approving, placing orders, tracking fulfilment and
making payments.
• Suppliers – creating and managing product information, customer
account classes and pricing, processing and completing orders,
responding to tenders.
• Market operators – running on-line market places facilitating purchaser
and supplier trading.
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Figure 1 — Tradezone Application Domains
Figure 2 shows an overview of the electronic marketplace envisaged by Tradezone.
Purchasers are able to source and order products through a custom browser window
accessing their approved suppliers, and through a supplier’s web site directly. There is
a range of approval, management and reporting functions supporting the procurement
process. Suppliers use a cataloguing system to create and maintain their product
information, and define different account classes with specific pricing. They collect
orders online and process through to fulfilment.
Market operators facilitate trading between partners in specific sectors (e.g., Internet
portal businesses are typical customers). They attract suppliers and purchasers to the
market, and can also import existing suppliers’ catalogues where relevant. But the
service as seen by an individual supplier or purchaser remains a one- to one- channel
between themselves and each purchaser or supplier with whom they have a business
relationship, i.e., it is not normally a public market where all suppliers are visible
(although it can be).
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Figure 2 — Overview of Electronic Marketplace
Here are two or three scenarios that suggest themselves as candidates for MAFTIA.
2.7.1.1 Catalogue Management and Publishing
Suppliers maintain their catalogue offline using software that communicates with the
online repository for uploading and classification consistency purposes. Information,
especially pricing structures, is sensitive and has to be protected from unauthorized
disclosure. Problems could occur if communication fails at any time.
2.7.1.2 Creation and Placement of Order
Requisitions and orders are persistent items created through workflow processes, and
finally communicated via Tradezone to suppliers. The transactions are digitally signed
and time-stamped and their integrity is essential to the legal acceptability of the
service. Tradezone will eventually be a distributed set of service operators, so that
these transactions will be communicated between servers operated by different
operators who have to be trusted parties. This requires a plan for dealing with
communication failures.
2.7.1.3 Tendering
Tradezone will extend purchasing systems to include support for the tendering
process using flexible documentation and workflow services. All such documents will
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be integral to workflow management, not just within organisations but between
organisations within the commercial framework. Maintaining document and process
integrity across the systems boundaries of Tradezone and customer sites is important
not only for functional coherence, but also for legal and financial reasons.
2.7.1.4 Tradezone’s Key Interests
The main interest areas that might be relevant to MAFTIA are as follows:
• Reliable systems support for distributed systems.
• Distributed certification / Certification Authorities (CAs).
• Protection of transactions and content in a multi-operator network.
2.7.2 Catalogue Management
Prices are changed off line and have to be confirmed by other individuals in the
supplier organisation (verification, anti-fraud). They then need to be approved by all
affected customers (customer-supplier relationships, trust) except for non-account
“retail” pricing; this requires sensitive price information to be sent to specific
customers, followed by confirmation or rejection, raising authentication, privacy and
completeness issues.
Suppliers must develop product types that are consistent with the existing type
definitions. A type approval service enforces this by preventing the publication of
catalogues until all product types are approved. This process could be compromised
by the interruption of application level communications.
Once published live, content needs to be updated in any other physical servers holding
affected subset catalogues. It is necessary to ensure that all replicas are consistent at
any point in time.
What for? Maintaining up to date product information and price schedules
relating to individual customers or groups of customer. Maintaining
consistency with a global product type space.
Why? Buyers want current product and custom pricing online. Suppliers
want control over content. Tradezone wants to maintain global
product definitions to ensure true multi-supplier comparisons by
buyers.
How? Strong authentication of each user. Separation of content
management and price management roles, established by the
authentication. Reconciliation between supplier’s local catalogue
copy and published copy in live service environment. Workflow
associated with publishing (verification by supplier, price change
approval by affected contract customers before going live).
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When? During upload and download of catalogue information, during
pricing updates, and during refresh of subsidiary catalogue
repositories.
2.7.3 Order Creation
A person wishing to order goods (the requisitioner) assembles a list of items, and
when satisfied proceeds to raise an order. This could be hours or days later. The order
will be only be created if certain constraints are met (buying limits, allowed supplier,
allowed product type etc), otherwise additional approval is required. A robust
workflow is needed to allow for errors or interruptions in the process.
Once created, the order is transmitted to the server and possibly to the supplier’s order
processing system. There is a danger of inconsistency between (a) the transaction logs
of Tradezone and the user’s applications, (b) the buyer’s internal product file and
Tradezone catalogue.
As an additional complication, the whole process may require messaging between two
physically distinct Tradezone infrastructures (e.g., in different countries).
What for? Purchase of goods from supplier – private, secure, non-repudiable.
Why? Reducing purchasing costs and delivery times, delegation of buying,
more purchasing control.
How? Electronic presentation of requisitions uses catalogue access to
create items, subjected to approval rules. Tests can result in
immediate order transmission or require single or multiple approvals
first. Users have to be strongly authenticated, workflow can’t break
down (otherwise orders never created), order–fulfilment and
dispatch is a single process with many possibilities for breakdown.
When? On the requisitioner’s or approver’s PC desktop, during approval
workflow process, during order transmission and presentation to
supplier.
2.7.4 Tendering
The creation of a tender requires a digital signature to be attached; this may be
transmitted to multiple (known) recipients. The sender has to trust that this process
has not been compromised. It is important for competitive tenders that receipt and
circumstances should be acknowledged. Preparing the response might involve a
multiparty workflow – each stage has to be authenticated and logged. Secure
archiving may be needed for legal obligations, with each stage in the document
workflow being logged to form an audit trail.
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What for? Purchasing of complex goods and services that can’t be represented
as off the shelf. Elicitation of competitive offers as opposed to
comparison of pre-defined offers.
Why? Cost reduction, faster turn round.
How? Use of documentation system allied with workflow process enables
complex transactions over period of time. Audit trail, accountability,
secure archiving.
When? During document creation/editing, during transmission, during co-
operative development of responses.
2.7.5 Analysis
The trust model for this application requires validation of the digital identities of each
human party and of the servers involved. This implies the need for a TTP network,
something that is not presently available. The security policy aims at providing strong
protection of the server side and separating application components whilst
maximising server-side functionality. Encryption and digital signatures are used for
all transactions to ensure privacy and detect tampering. The goal is to encapsulate the
user-to-user transaction space in a single security shell.
The main risks and threats to the application are:
• Tampering with transaction contents (items, values, delivery information,
etc.).
• Malicious or unintended visibility of information intended for one class of
account.
• Tampering with supplier catalogue content/pricing.
• Growth of inconsistencies in content or transaction logs between different
servers due to communication faults.
• Spoofing of digital identities.
• Server-side unauthorised human intervention.
• Lack of TTP certification of digital identities.
The following mechanisms are used to guard against malicious attacks from intruders
or corrupt insiders:
Privacy and integrity: Strong encryption and digital signatures
Repudiation: Digital signatures and time stamps
Authorisation: Digital certificates with PIN (and smart card carrier)
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Availability: Network and server redundancy (plus hot swap)
Most of the proposed mechanisms being developed by the MAFTIA project are
relevant to all of these scenarios, with the possible exception of fault and intrusion
tolerant consensus. However, clearly fault and intrusion tolerant transactions, group
communications, trusted third parties, distributed authorisation and intrusion detection
services are all important.
2.8 Networking in an Aeronautic Environment
J.-C. Lebraud, Rockwell-Collins (F)
2.8.1 Introduction
This section describes possible scenarios for the MAFTIA project in the context
developed by Rockwell Collins for Airlines in the I2S (Integrated Information
System).
The general idea of I2S is to provide an Airline with a means of data communication
between an airborne network and the ground network of the company; i.e. to consider
the aircraft as an extension of the airline network. Any equipped aircraft should be
able to land in any equipped airport and get a connection with its company network
(see Figure 3).
The connection between the aircraft and the ground network occurs only on the
ground when the aircraft is at an airport. The connection is wireless using the 802.11
standard for wireless IP connections.
The airport is equipped with a wireless access point at the gates, with all airlines
sharing the same communication media. Once on the ground, data are routed from
aircraft to the company network using either private or public networks.
On the aircraft side, the LAN is flexible enough to accommodate mobile users (the
crew moves from aircraft to aircraft, using the same laptop). This network is also a
wireless LAN to simplify connectivity. The network is built around a network server,
which is COTS (commercial off the shelf) equipment (repackaged for the aircraft
environment). The wireless LAN is also COTS equipment.
A firewall function allows LAN users (airborne or ground) to access avionics systems
using a proprietary protocol.
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Figure 3 — Description of an I2S Airport
Several aspects of security need to be considered:
• Aircraft protection: protect avionics and all actions that impact aircraft
dispatch. This is a highly important feature. The system should be, at least, as
safe as the current manual procedures.
• Protect data between aircraft and airline from competing companies. The
airline world is a very competitive environment, and companies are very
jealous about their data (quality of flight, flight information…)
• Ensure that data are sent by the correct transmitter and not by an impostor. For
example, it is highly important to be sure that flight information sent to an
aircraft is from the operation centre of the company.
• The next step will be to open services such as email and Internet access up to
passengers, using the same system. Sharing a private highly-controlled world
with an open one will really become an issue.
In the I2S project, security issues have been solved using end-to-end encryption and
certificate based user authentication.
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2.8.2 Scenarios
Two kinds of scenario can be proposed, one regarding the access to aircraft and to
avionics, the second regarding protection of company privacy.
2.8.3 Aircraft Access
A hacker or corrupt insider, using the same COTS product as the aircraft system, may
listen to radio communication, and spoof the airborne server, use some existing user
account and access applications. Some maintenance applications are very sensitive as
they can access avionics and change the content of their firmware. Thus, possible
threats to the application include someone modifying avionics information such as the
flight plan, or the airborne system becoming overloaded and thus inoperative for
normal usage. The potential risk could vary from delayed departure through hijacking
to aircraft destruction.
One possible trust model would be to limit use of the radio link to authorized users.
Users would need to logon to the system first, but this authentication would only take
place once during a session, so a hacker might be able to spoof the system by taking
the place of a real user. Thus, the system would need to perform user authentication
checks randomly throughout the session, and perhaps detect doubtful users and
discard any requests from them using anomaly detection systems. The most relevant
MAFTIA technologies would be fault- and intrusion- tolerant atomic transactions,
trusted third parties, and intrusion detection.
2.8.4 Ground Access
Company private information travels from aircraft to the ground company network,
using radio links and public networks. These media are shared between airlines and
service companies. The risk is to have sensitive data misrouted, re-routed or
duplicated to a competitive company. For example, such information might be used
by a competitor to claim that the airline company didn’t maintain its aircraft to a
sufficiently high level.
A strong authentication of the communicating peer may avoid misrouting, but does
not prevent someone from listening to data. End-to-end encryption can be used but
does not prevent some third party listener. The security policy would be for the
message handling system used between aircraft and ground to provide server
authentication, with users being separately authenticated. All of the proposed
MAFTIA mechanisms would be useful for dealing with this scenario.
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Chapter 3 Basic Concepts
Y. Deswarte, J.-C. Laprie, D. Powell, LAAS-CNRS, Toulouse (F)
The purpose of this chapter is to show how basic dependability concepts can be
extended to deal with malicious faults and intrusions. We first recall some core
dependability concepts, extracted mostly literatim from [Laprie et al. 1998,
chapter 1]3. We then extend and refine these definitions in the context of security and
intrusion tolerance/detection. Readers familiar with the core dependability concepts
may proceed directly to Section 3.2, page 40.
3.1 Core Dependability Concepts
3.1.1 Basic Definitions
Dependability is that property of a computer system such that reliance can justifiably
be placed on the service it delivers. The service delivered by a system is its behaviour
as perceived by its user(s); a user is another system (human or physical) interacting
with the system considered.
According to the application(s) of the system, different facets of dependability may be
highlighted. This is tantamount to stating that dependability can be viewed according
to different but complementary properties that allow its attributes to be defined:
• readiness for usage leads to availability;
• service continuity leads to reliability;
• non-occurrence of catastrophic consequences for the environment leads to
safety;
• non-occurrence of unauthorised disclosure of information leads to
confidentiality;
• non-occurrence of inadequate information alterations leads to integrity;
• ability to conduct repairs and introduce evolutions leads to maintainability.
Security is generally considered as the combination of confidentiality, integrity and
availability [ITSEC], in particular relative to the authorised actions.
A failure of the system occurs when the delivered service deviates from
implementing the system function, that is, from what the system is intended for. An
error is that part of the system state that may lead to a failure: an error affecting the
                                                 
3
 The most recent readily-available version of these concepts may be found in [Laprie 1995].
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service is an indication of a failure occurring or which has occurred. The adjudged or
hypothesised cause of an error is a fault.
Development of a dependable system requires the combined use of a set of methods
that can be listed as follows:
• fault prevention: how to prevent the occurrence or introduction of faults;
• fault tolerance: how to provide a service capable of implementing the system
function despite faults;
• fault removal: how to reduce the presence (number, severity) of faults;
• fault forecasting: how to estimate the presence, creation and consequences of
faults.
The notions that have been introduced can be listed under three main headings (as
shown in Figure 4):
• impairments to dependability: faults, errors, failures; these are undesirable —
but not unexpected — circumstances, causes or results of un-dependability
(that can be simply derived from the definition of dependability: trust can no
longer, or will no longer, be put in the service delivered);
• the means for dependability: fault prevention, fault tolerance, fault removal,
fault forecasting; these are the methods and techniques giving the system the
ability to deliver a service conforming to the accomplishment of its function,
and to place trust in this ability;
• attributes of dependability: availability, reliability, safety, confidentiality,
integrity, maintainability: these enable a) expression of the properties expected
from the system, and b) assessment of the quality of the service delivered, as
resulting from the impairments and the means used to avoid them.
DEPENDABILITY
ATTRIBUTES
AVAILABILITY 
RELIABILITY
SAFETY
CONFIDENTIALITY
INTEGRITY
MAINTAINABILITY
FAULT PREVENTION
FAULT TOLERANCE
FAULT REMOVAL
FAULT FORECASTING
MEANS
IMPAIRMENTS
FAULTS
ERRORS
FAILURES
Figure 4 — The Dependability Tree
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3.1.2 On the Function, Behaviour and Structure of a System
So far, a system has — implicitly — been considered as a whole, emphasis being
placed on behaviour as perceived from the outside. A definition according to this
“black box” vision is: a system is an entity having interacted or interfered, interacting
or interfering, or likely to interact or interfere, with other entities, that is, other
systems. The latter make up or will make up the environment of the system
considered.4 A system user is part of the environment interacting with the latter: a
user provides inputs to the system and/or receives outputs from it. In other words,
what distinguishes a user from the other parts of the environment is the fact that he
uses the service delivered by the system.
As already pointed out in Section 3.1.1, the function of a system is what it is intended
for. The behaviour of a system is what it does. What enables it to do what it does is
its structure [Ziegler 1976]. Adopting the spirit of [Lee & Anderson 1990], a
definition of a system from a structural point of view (“white box” or “glass box”) is
the following: a system is a set of components interconnected in order to interact; a
component is another system, etc. Decomposition ends when a system is considered
atomic: in other words, no subsequent decomposition can be envisaged either by
nature or because it is devoid of interest. The term “component” must be understood
in its broad sense: layers of a system as well as intra-layer components; in addition, a
component being itself a system encompasses the relationships between the
components that make it up. A more conventional definition of the structure of a
system is what the system is. This definition remains appropriate as long as
dependability impairments are not considered and, therefore, the structure is
considered to be frozen. However, as dependability impairments can be structural
changes, or can cause or result from structural changes, a structure can have states.5
Hence a definition of the notion of state: a state is a condition of being relative to a
                                                 
4 a) Giving recursive definitions allows the relativity of the notion of system to be underlined
according to the point of view considered: a system will not be looked at in the same way
by a designer, its users and the maintenance teams.
b) Use of the past, present and future is intended to show that the system environment will
change, particularly during the various phases of the life cycle. For example, the notion of
“programming environment” can be integrated with the definition given, as well as with
the physical environment to which a system can be confronted during its operational life
5 One can therefore say that a structure also features a behaviour, particularly, relative to
dependability impairments, even if the pace of changes considered relative to, on the one
hand, the user's requests and, on the other the dependability impairments, are — as should be
noted — radically different.
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set of circumstances; this definition applies to the behaviour of a system as well as to
its structure.6
Owing to its definition (the behaviour perceived by a user), the service delivered by a
system is clearly an abstraction of the latter’s behaviour. It is worth pointing out that
this abstraction directly depends on the application for which the system is used. One
example of this is the role played by time of this abstraction: time granularities of a
system and of its users are usually different and vary according to the application
concerned. In addition, the notion of service is not, of course, limited to outputs only
but includes all interactions of interest to the user; for example, to scan sensors is
clearly part of the service expected from a monitoring system.
So far, we have used the singular for function and service. Usually, a system
implements more than one function and delivers more than one service. Thus,
function and service can be considered as composed of function elements and service
elements. For clarity, we will use the plural — functions, services — when it is
necessary or useful to make a distinction between several elements of function or
service.
Given the preceding definition for the structure of a system, the notions of function
and service naturally apply to components. This is particularly relevant in the design
process when pre-existing hardware or software components are incorporated into a
system: the designer is more interested in the function of the component or service it
delivers than its detailed (internal) behaviour.
The specification of the system, that is, an agreed 7 description of the function or
service expected from the system, plays a pivotal role in dependability. Generally, the
function or service is described or specified first in terms of what should be
implemented or delivered according to the primary purpose of the system (for
example, to carry out transactions, order or monitor a process, pilot a plane or guide a
missile, etc.). With respect to security or safety systems, this description is usually
completed by a statement of what should not occur (for example, hazardous states that
could cause a catastrophe or the disclosure of sensitive information). This latter
description leads to the identification of additional functions the system should
implement to reduce the possibilities of what should not occur (e.g., identification of a
user and verification of his rights).
In addition, the specification of these diverse functions can be:
                                                 
6 This definition is designed to lay the stress on a notion of state that depends directly on the
phenomena and circumstances considered; for example: states relative to the information
processing activities, states relative to the occurrence of failure, etc.
7 An agreement is usually struck between two persons or groups of persons, physical or moral:
the system vendor (in its broad sense: designer, manufacturer, seller, etc.) and its human users.
The agreement may be implicit — during the purchase of a system with its specification and
the user’s manual or when employing off-the-shelf systems.
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• expressed according to various points of view or degrees of detail:
specification of the needs, design specification, implementation specification,
etc.,
• decomposed in accordance with the absence or presence of a failure; the first
case relates to what is usually referred to as the nominal mode of operation
and the second may deal with the so-called degraded mode of operation, if the
remaining resources are no longer adequate for the nominal mode to be
provided.
As a result, there exist several specifications, not one only, and a system can fail
relative to one of them while still satisfying the others.
The expression of the functions of a system is an activity that is naturally initiated in
the very early stages of a system development. However, generally, it is not limited to
this phase of a system’s lifetime. In fact, experience has shown that the process of
specifying the system functions has to be pursued throughout the system’s lifetime, as
it is difficult to identify what is expected of it.
3.1.3 Human-made Faults
Faults and their sources are highly diverse. Five main points of view can be
considered to classify them. These are the phenomenological cause, nature, phase of
creation or occurrence, situation relative to the system boundaries, and persistence
[Laprie et al. 1998, chapter 1] (see Figure 5).
PHYSICAL FAULTS
HUMAN-MADE FAULTS
PHENOMENOLOGICAL
CAUSE
ACCIDENTAL FAULTS
INTENTIONAL, NON-MALICIOUS FAULTS
INTENTIONALLY MALICIOUS FAULTS
 NATURE
FAULTS
DEVELOPMENT FAULTS
OPERATIONAL FAULTS
PHASE OF CREATION 
OR OCCURENCE
INTERNAL FAULTS
EXTERNAL FAULTS
SYSTEM BOUNDARIES
PERMANENT FAULTS
TEMPORARY FAULTS
PERSISTENCE
Figure 5 — Classes of Elementary Faults
Of particular interest to MAFTIA, are human-made faults, which correspond to four
classes of combined faults:
• design faults, which are development faults, accidental or intentional with no
malicious intent;
• interaction faults, which are external faults, accidental or intentional with no
malicious intent;
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• malicious logic, which consists of internal, intentionally malicious faults;
• intrusions, which are external, operational, intentionally malicious faults.
Some comments upon these classes of human made faults:
1. Intentional design faults with no malicious intent usually result from tradeoffs
during the development, made with a concern for maintaining a suitable level of
system performance or for facilitating system use, or even for economic
reasons; these faults can be sources of security impairments in the form of
hidden channels. Intentional interaction faults with no malicious intent can
result from an operator attempting to address an unexpected event or
deliberately acting in breach of procedures without realizing the detrimental
effects of his action. Generally, intentional faults performed without malicious
intent are only identified as such after they have caused an unacceptable
behaviour of the system, hence a failure.
2. Interaction faults are defined above as a class of human-made external faults
that includes both accidental faults and intentional faults without malicious
intent. These sub-classes should not be confused with the two error classes
commonly considered for operators [Norman 1983]: intention errors (i.e., errors
in the formulation of the interaction objective) and execution errors (i.e., errors
in implementing these intentions).
3. Malicious logic covers development faults such as Trojan horses, trapdoors,
logic or timing bombs, and operational faults (for the system considered) such
as viruses and worms [Landwehr et al. 1994]. These faults can be defined as
follows:
• a logic bomb is part of a program that remains dormant in the host
system till a certain time or an event occurs, or certain conditions are
met, unleashing devastating consequences for the host system;
• a Trojan horse is a program performing an illegitimate action while
giving the impression of being legitimate; the illegitimate action can be
the disclosure or modification of information (attack against
confidentiality or integrity) or a logic bomb;
• a trapdoor is a means of circumventing access control mechanisms; it
is a flaw in the security system due to an accidental or intentional
design fault (Trojan horse in particular);
• a virus is a program segment that replicates itself and joins another
program (system or application) when it is executed, thereby turning
into a Trojan horse; a virus can carry a logic bomb;
• a worm is an independent program that replicates itself and propagates
without the users being aware of it; a worm can also carry a logic
bomb.
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4 .  As will be detailed in Section 3.3.1, intrusions can only be successful if
vulnerabilities such as design faults are present; evident and nevertheless
interesting similarities can be found between an intrusion and an external
accidental fault “taking advantage” of a lack of shielding. However, as noted in
Section 3.3.1, despite their external nature, intrusions may also be attempted by
operators or managers of the system overriding their commission.
3.1.4 Fault Tolerance
Fault tolerance [Avizienis 1967] is carried out by error processing and by fault
treatment [Anderson & Lee 1981]. Error processing is aimed at removing errors
from the computational state, if possible before failure occurrence; fault treatment is
aimed at preventing faults from being activated — again.
Error processing can be carried out via three primitives:
• error detection, which enables an erroneous state to be identified as such;
• error diagnosis, which aims to assess the damage caused by the detected
error, or by errors propagated before detection;
• error recovery, where an error-free state is substituted for the erroneous state;
this substitution may take on three forms:
– backward recovery, where transformation of the erroneous state
consists of bringing the system back to a state already occupied prior to
error occurrence; this involves the establishment of recovery points,
which are points in time during the execution of a process for which
the then current state may subsequently need to be restored;
– forward recovery, where transformation of the erroneous state
consists of finding a new state, from which the system can operate
(frequently in a degraded mode);
– compensation, where the erroneous state contains enough redundancy
to enable its transformation into an error-free state.
When backward recovery or forward recovery are utilised, error detection must
precede error recovery. These techniques are not antagonistic: a backward recovery
may first be attempted; if the error persists, forward recovery may then be undertaken.
In the latter case, the error diagnosis must take place before undertaking recovery;
error diagnosis is not — in theory — necessary in the case of a backward recovery
provided the mechanisms for implementing error recovery have not been affected
[Anderson & Lee 1981].
The addition of error detection mechanisms to the component’s functional processing
capabilities leads to the notion of self-checking component, for the hardware [Carter
& Schneider 1968, Wakerly 1978, Nicolaïdis et al. 1989] or software [Yau & Cheung
1975, Laprie et al. 1990]. One of the main advantages of self-checking components is
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the possibility of clearly defining error confinement domains [Siewiorek & Johnson
1982]. When error compensation is carried out in a system made up of self-checking
components partitioned into given classes of task execution, error recovery reduces to
a switchover from a failed component to a non-failed one within the same class. On
the other hand, error compensation may be applied systematically, even in the absence
of errors, thereby providing fault masking (e.g., through a majority vote). Error
detection is not, then, strictly speaking, needed to perform recovery. However, to
avoid an undetected decrease in the redundancy available during a component failure,
practical implementations of masking usually include an error detection facility,
which may in this case be initiated after recovery.
The operational time overhead (in terms of execution) needed for error processing
may vary considerably according to the technique used:
• in the case of error recovery based on backward recovery or forward recovery,
the time overhead is more important when an error occurs than when it does
not. In the case of backward recovery, the time overhead consists in
establishing recovery points and, therefore, in laying the groundwork for error
processing;
• in error compensation, the time overhead remains unchanged or almost the
same whether or not there exists an error.8
In addition, error compensation is much faster than with a backward recovery and
forward recovery owing to the much more important structural redundancy. This
remark:
• carries a certain weight in practice because it often conditions the choice of a
fault tolerance strategy relative to the time granularity of the system user;
• introduces a relationship between operational time overhead and structural
redundancy. More generally, a redundant system always provides redundant
behaviour, incurring at least some operational time overhead. The time
overhead may be small enough not to be perceived by the user, which means
only that the service is not redundant. An extreme form of time overhead is
“time redundancy” (redundant behaviour obtained by repetition), which needs
to be at least initiated by a structural redundancy, even in a limited form.
Typically, the greater the structural redundancy, the lower the time overhead.
The first step in fault treatment is fault diagnosis, which consists in determining the
causes of errors in terms of localisation and nature. Then, the steps needed to fulfil the
main objective of fault treatment are carried out to prevent faults from being
reactivated, hence fault isolation. To do so, the components deemed faulty are
                                                 
8
 In all cases, the time to update the system state tables increases the time overhead.
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removed from the subsequent execution process9. If the system is no longer able to
provide the same service as before, a reconfiguration may be envisaged by
modifying the system structure so that fault-free components provide an adequate,
although degraded, service. Reconfiguration may mean scrapping a number of tasks,
or reallocating some of them to the remaining devices.
If it is thought that the fault has vanished after error processing or if its probability of
recurrence is low enough, isolation becomes unnecessary. As long as fault isolation
has not been undertaken, a fault is considered soft; undertaking isolation means that
the fault is hard, or solid. At first sight, the notions of soft fault and hard fault may
seem synonymous with that of temporary fault and permanent fault. Indeed,
temporary faults can be tolerated without the need for fault treatment since error
recovery should theoretically directly suppress the effects of a temporary fault, which
will vanish unless a permanent fault is created by the propagation process. In fact the
notions of soft fault and hard fault are useful, for the following reasons:
• distinguishing between a permanent fault and a temporary one is not easy and
highly complex since a temporary fault vanishes after a certain amount of
time, generally, before diagnosis is carried out and distinct classes of faults
can give rise to similar errors; thus, the notion of soft or hard fault carries
implicitly the subjectivity associated with these difficulties, including the fact
that a fault can be considered soft following unsuccessful diagnosis;
• their ability to take into consideration subtleties in the action modes of certain
transient faults; for example, can a dormant fault due to the action of alpha
particles, or of heavy ions in space, on memory elements (in the broad sense of
the word, including flip-flops) be regarded a temporary fault? This fault is
definitely a soft fault however.
The foregoing considerations apply to physical faults as well as design faults: the fault
classes that can be tolerated in practice depend on the fault assumptions made in the
design process, which are conditioned by the independence of redundancies relative to
the fault creation and activation processes. An example is provided by considering
tolerance of physical faults and tolerance of design faults. A (widely used) method to
attain fault tolerance is to perform multiple computations through multiple channels.
When tolerance of physical faults is foreseen, the channels may be identical, based on
the assumption that hardware components fail independently. However, such an
approach is not suitable for the tolerance of design faults. To tolerate design faults, the
multiple channels have to provide identical services through separate designs and
implementations [Elmendorf 1972, Randell 1975, Avizienis 1978], i.e., through
design diversity. Design diversity is intended to tolerate permanent design faults. On
the other hand, a backward recovery based error processing usually enables temporary
design faults to be tolerated [Gray 1986].
                                                 
9
 Usually, removed faulty components can be repaired and re-inserted into the system; such
curative maintenance can be considered as an ultimate form of fault-tolerance.
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An important aspect of co-ordinating the activities of multiple components is ensuring
that the propagation of errors has no effect on fault-free components. This is
particularly important when a given component must transmit a piece of information
to other components. Typical examples of information obtained from a single source
are local sensor data, the value of a local clock, the local perception of the state of the
other components, etc. As a result, fault-free components must agree on how to use
consistently the information obtained and, therefore, protect against possibly
inconsistent failures (e.g., atomic broadcast [Cristian et al. 1985], clock
synchronisation [Lamport & Melliar-Smith 1985, Kopetz & Ochsenreiter 1987] or
membership protocols [Cristian 1988]). It should be noted, however, that the
unavoidable presence of structural redundancies in any fault tolerant system requires a
resource distribution at one level or another, leading to the persistence of the
consensus problem. Geographically localised fault-tolerant systems may employ
solutions to the agreement problem that would be deemed too costly in a “classical”
distributed system of components communicating by messages (e.g. inter-stages [Lala
1986], multiple stages for interactive consistency [Frison & Wensley 1982]).
The knowledge of certain properties of the system may allow the required redundancy
to be limited. Classical examples are given by regularities of a structural nature: error
detecting and correcting codes [Peterson & Weldon 1972], robust data structures
[Taylor et al. 1980], multiprocessors and networks [Pradhan 1986, Rennels 1986],
algorithm-based fault tolerance [Huang & Abraham 1982]. The faults that can be
tolerated are then dependent upon the properties considered since these properties are
directly involved in the fault assumptions made during the design.
Warning users about the failure of a component is extremely important. This can be
taken into consideration within the framework of exceptions [Melliar-Smith &
Randell 1977, Cristian 1980, Anderson & Lee 1981]. Exception handling facilities
provided in some languages may constitute a convenient way for implementing error
recovery, especially forward recovery10.
Fault tolerance is (also) a recursive concept; the mechanisms designed to tolerate
faults must be protected against the faults likely to affect them. Examples are given by
the replication of voters, self-checking controllers [Carter & Schneider 1968], through
the notion of “stable” memory [Lampson 1981] in recovery data and programs.
Fault tolerance is not limited to accidental faults. Protecting against intrusions has
long relied on cryptography [Denning 1982], which can be viewed as a form of
tolerance in that ciphered information can be inspected by an intruder without
compromising its confidentiality. Certain error detection mechanisms are designed for
accidental as well as intentional faults (e.g., memory access protection techniques),
                                                 
10
 The term “exception”, due to its origin of coping with exceptional situations — not only errors
— should be used carefully in the framework of fault tolerance: it could appear as
contradicting the view that fault tolerance is a natural attribute of computing systems, taken
into consideration from the very initial design phases, and not an “exceptional” attribute.
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and approaches have been put forward to tolerate both intrusions and physical faults
[Fray et al. 1986, Rabin 1989], and to tolerate malicious logic faults [Joseph &
Avizienis 1988]. The MAFTIA project aims to follow this very approach, by building
on this earlier work and extending it to the case of large distributed systems.
3.2 Security Properties
Dependability has been defined in Section 3.1.1 as “that property of a computer
system such that reliance can justifiably be placed on the service it delivers”.
According to the application requirements, the service may be requested to exhibit
certain functional or non-functional properties, such as, for instance, accuracy of the
computation results, respect of real-time deadlines, or other “quality-of-service”
characteristics. Some of these properties have to be fulfilled continuously: this is
generally the case of safety and confidentiality properties (an item of information that
is no longer secret cannot become secret again). Other properties can alternate
between being fulfilled and not being fulfilled, as long as they are fulfilled when the
service is delivered: this is generally the case of integrity properties (an item of
information only needs to be correct at the instant it is read).
Many security properties can be defined in terms of the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of the information or the service itself, or of some meta-information11
related to the information or service. Examples of such meta-information are:
• time of a service delivery, or of creation, modification or destruction of an
item of information;
• identity of the person who has realised an operation: creator of an item of
information, author of a document, sender or receiver of an item of
information, etc.;
• location or address of an item of information, a communication entity, a
device, etc.;
• existence of an item of information or of the service;
• existence of an information transfer, or a communication channel, or of a
message, etc.;
• occurrence of an operation;
• sensitivity level of an item of information or meta-information;
• certainty or plausibility level of an item of information or meta-information;
• etc.
                                                 
11
 Of course, at some level (e.g., at the operating system level), meta-information is “real”
information.
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For example, accountability [CEN 13608-1, ISO 7498-2, Trouessin 2000]
corresponds to the availability and integrity of a set of meta-information concerning
the existence of an operation, the identity of the person who realised the operation, the
time of the operation, etc. Anonymity is the confidentiality of the identity of the
person, for instance, who realised (or did not realise) an operation. Traffic analysis is
an attack against the confidentiality of communication meta-information, to gain
knowledge of the existence of a channel, of the existence of a message, identities,
locations or addresses of the message sender and receiver, the time of a
communication, etc.
Privacy is confidentiality with respect to personal data, which can be either
“information” (such as the content of a registration database), or “meta-information”
such as the identity of a user who has performed a particular operation, or sent a
particular message, or received the message, etc.
Authenticity is the property of being “genuine”. For a message, authenticity is
equivalent to integrity of both the message content (information integrity) and of the
message origin, and possibly of other meta-information such as time of emission,
classification level, etc. (meta-information integrity). Similarly, a document is
authentic if its content has not been altered (information integrity) and optionally if
the declared author is the real author and not a plagiarist, if the publication date is
correct, etc. (meta-information integrity). Likewise, an alleged user is authentic if the
declared identity is the real identity of that person. Authentication is the process that
gives confidence in authenticity.
Non-repudiation corresponds to the availability and integrity of some meta-
information, such as creator identity (and possibly time of creation) for non-
repudiation of origin, or such as reception and receiver identity for non-repudiation of
reception.
It is conjectured that all security properties can be expressed in terms of the
availability, integrity and confidentiality properties applied to information and meta-
information.
3.3 Intrusion-tolerance Concepts
3.3.1 Intrusion vs. Attack
A first terminology issue concerns the use of the very word “intrusion” to designate
an external, operational, intentionally malicious fault (cf. Section 3.1.3, page 34).
Etymologically, the word “intrusion” comes from the Latin intrudere (to thrust in) but
current usage covers both senses of “illegal penetration” and “unwanted interruption”.
Even a malicious interaction fault perpetrated by an insider can thus be classed as an
intrusion since the intent is to carry out an operation on some resource that is
unwanted by the owner of that resource.
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A possible alternative to “intrusion” would be the word “attack”. However, it would
seem that both terms are necessary, but for different concepts. A system can be
attacked (either from the outside or the inside) without any degree of success. In this
case, the attack exists, but the protective “wall” around the system or resource
targeted by the attack is sufficiently efficacious to prevent intrusion. An attack is thus
an intrusion attempt and an intrusion results from an attack that has been (at least
partially) successful.
In fact, there are two underlying causes of any intrusion:
1. The malicious act or attack that attempts to exploit a weakness in the system,
2. At least one weakness, flaw or vulnerability, which is an accidental fault, or a
malicious or non-malicious intentional fault, in the requirements, the specification,
the design or the configuration of the system, or in the way it is used.
This is a similar situation to that of external (or, to be precise, “externally-induced”)
physical faults: a heavy ion approaching the system from outside is like an attack. The
aim of shielding is to prevent the heavy ion from penetrating the system. If the
shielding is insufficient, a fault will occur (e.g., a bit-flip). Mechanisms can be
implemented inside the system to tolerate such “external” faults.
Since we are essentially concerned with techniques aimed at providing security
guarantees in spite of imperfect “shielding” of the considered system, in the sequel we
will prefer to refer to just vulnerabilities and the intrusions that result from their
successful exploitation by an attacker (who is, ipso facto, an intruder). Typical
examples are:
1. An outsider penetrating a system by guessing a user password: the vulnerability
lies in the configuration of the system, with a poor choice of password (too short,
or susceptible to a dictionary attack).
2. An insider abusing his authority (i.e., a misfeasance): the vulnerability lies in the
specification or the design of the (socio-technical) system (violation of the
principle of least privilege, inadequate vetting of key personnel).
3. An outsider using “social engineering”, e.g., bribery, to cause an insider to carry
out a misfeasance on his behalf: the vulnerability is the presence of a bribable
insider, which in turn is due to inadequate design of the (socio-technical) system
(inadequate vetting of key personnel).
4. A denial-of-service attack by request overload (e.g., the February 2000 DDoS12
attacks of Web sites): the vulnerability lies partly in the very requirements of the
system since it is contradictory to require a system to be completely open to all
well-intended users and closed to malicious users. This particular type of attack
also exploits design or configuration faults in the many Internet-connected hosts
that were penetrated to insert the zombie daemons required to mount a co-
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 DDoS: Distributed Denial of Service.
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ordinated distributed attack [Garber 2000]. A third vulnerability, that prevents
effective countermeasures from being launched, resides in a design fault caused
by Internet service providers not implementing ingress/egress filtering (which
would enable the originating IP source address to be traced).
3.3.2 Outsiders vs. Insiders
In the previous section, we referred to attackers as being either “outsiders” or
“insiders”. What exactly is the distinction between the two?
In common parlance, an insider is “a person within a society, organisation, etc. or a
person privy to a secret, especially when using it to gain advantage” [OMED 1992].
The first part of this definition can be interpreted in terms of the rights of the
considered person. A person has a right on a specified object within the system if and
only if he is authorised to perform a specified operation on that object — a right is
thus an object-operation pair. The set of rights of the considered person is that
person’s privilege. An outsider might thus be defined as a person who has no
privilege, i.e., no rights on any object in the system. Inversely, an insider is thus any
individual who has some privilege, i.e., some rights on objects in the system.
Consider now the case of an “open” system, such as a public web server. Such
systems allow any user at least read access rights on certain objects within the system
so, with the above definitions, all users would be considered as insiders. The very
notion of an outsider, as defined above, is only relevant for closed systems.
An alternative distinction is thus necessary for open systems. The second part of the
dictionary definition of an insider relates both to the knowledge of the considered
person and the illegal use of this knowledge13. The distinction between outsider and
insider must thus be made in terms of the types of attack that can be perpetrated by
the considered person: unauthorised increase in privilege or abuse of privilege. The
distinction between “inside” or “outside” must be made with respect to a subset of the
universe of object-operation pairs of the considered system, rather than the complete
system:
• outsider: a human user not authorised to perform any of a set of specified
operations on a set of specified objects, i.e., a user whose (current) privilege
does not intersect the considered domain of object-operation pairs.
• insider: a human user authorised to perform some of a set of specified
operations on a set of specified objects, i.e., a user whose (current) privilege
intersects the considered domain of object-operation pairs.
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 The relationship between knowledge and right needs to be explored further, especially in
terms of concepts such as the need to know and the principle of least privilege.
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A: privilege 
of user a
universe of object-operation pairs
D: an object-operation
domain
B: privilege
of user b
Figure 6 — Outsider (user a) vs. Insider (user b) with respect to
Domain D
In Figure 6, user a is currently an outsider with respect to domain D  since his
privilege does not intersect the considered domain D. User b is an insider with respect
to domain D but an outsider with respect to sub-domain D-B. According to these
definitions of outsider and insider, two basic forms of intrusion are:
• outsider intrusion: an unauthorised increase in privilege, i.e., a change in the
privilege of a user that is not permitted by the system’s security policy.
• insider intrusion: an abuse of privilege or misfeasance, i.e., an improper use
of authorised operations.
3.3.3 Security methods
Equating intrusion and vulnerability with fault, and applying the definitions given in
Section 3.1.1, we can obtain a priori eight methods for ensuring or assessing security.
However, not all of these eight methods are distinguishable or indeed meaningful.
First, since an intrusion cannot occur in the absence of vulnerability, intrusion
tolerance and vulnerability tolerance are equivalent in the sense that tolerance of an
intrusion implies tolerance of the vulnerability or vulnerabilities that were exploited to
perpetrate the intrusion. To conform to current usage, we will refer to intrusion
tolerance. Second, fault removal normally refers to verification methods (including
testing) aimed at finding internal faults. As such, only vulnerability removal is
meaningful, since intrusions are external faults. Countermeasures aimed against
intruders are better classified as a form of intrusion tolerance since, like maintenance
or other fault treatment actions, they aim to maintain or to restore the ability of the
system to fulfil its function. We thus obtain six meaningful methods:
vulnerability prevention: how to prevent the occurrence or introduction of
vulnerabilities;
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This includes measures going from formal specification, rigorous design
and system management procedures, up to and including user education
(e.g., choice of passwords).
intrusion prevention: how to prevent the occurrence of intrusions;
This includes measures such as social pressure or deterrence, as well as
vulnerability prevention (see above).
intrusion tolerance: how to provide a service capable of implementing the
system function despite intrusions;
Admitting that intrusion prevention, and vulnerability prevention and
removal are always imperfect, intrusion tolerance aims to ensure that the
considered system provides security guarantees in spite of partially
successful attacks.
vulnerability removal: how to reduce the presence (number, severity) of
vulnerabilities;
This covers verification procedures such as formal proof, model-checking
and testing, specifically aimed at identifying flaws that could be exploited
by an attacker. Identified flaws may then be removed by applying a
security patch, withdrawing a given service, changing a password, etc.
vulnerability forecasting: how to estimate the presence, creation and
consequences of vulnerabilities.
This includes the gathering of statistics about the current state of
knowledge regarding system flaws, and the difficulties that an attacker
would have to take advantage of them.
intrusion forecasting: how to estimate the presence and consequences of
intrusions.
This includes the gathering of statistics about how frequently people run
attacks, and against whom and how.
3.3.4 Intrusion Detection
In Section 3.1.1, a fault is defined to be the adjudged or hypothesised cause of an
error, the latter being that part of the system state that may lead to a failure.
Whereas a security failure is naturally defined in terms of loss of confidentiality,
integrity or availability, there is currently no agreed definition of what constitutes an
error from the security viewpoint. However, current literature refers to “intrusion
detection” which, from the dependability concept viewpoint, might lead one to equate
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intrusion with “error”, rather than “fault”14. In reality, current literature uses the term
“intrusion detection” to cover a spectrum of techniques. To paraphrase [Halme &
Bauer]: “Intrusion detection may be accomplished:
• after the fact (as in post-mortem audit analysis),
• in near real-time (supporting SSO15 intervention or interaction with the
intruder, such as a network trace-back to point of origin), or
• in real time (in support of automated countermeasures).”
From the dependability concept viewpoint, these three types of intrusion detection can
be interpreted respectively as:
• off-line fault diagnosis (as part of curative maintenance);
• error detection and on-line fault diagnosis (to an operator-assisted fault
treatment facility);
• error detection (as a preliminary to automatic error recovery), or error
detection and on-line fault diagnosis (as a preliminary to automatic fault
treatment).
Further confusion is introduced by the opposition in [Halme & Bauer] between a
“manually reviewed IDS”16 (called a passive IDS in [Debar et al. 1999]) and
“Intrusion Countermeasure Equipment (ICE)” or “autonomously acting IDS” (sic)
(called an active IDS in [Debar et al. 1999]), which clearly go beyond just detection.
Again, from [Halme & Bauer], intrusion detection techniques can be divided into:
• anomaly detection techniques, that compare observed activity against normal
usage profiles (in [Debar et al. 1999], these are called behaviour-based
methods);
                                                 
14
 Note, however, that it is also quite common in the literature on tolerance of physical faults to
find the term “fault detection” used in one of two ways:
a) As a clumsy synonym for “error detection” (since detection of an error implies, rather
indirectly and perhaps falsely, the “detection” of its cause)
b) As the designation of a mechanism that seeks out (dormant) faults by running a test
procedure to activate them as errors that can be detected by an error detection
mechanism.
15
 SSO: System Security Officer.
16
 IDS: Intrusion Detection System.
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• misuse detection techniques, that check for known undesired activity profiles
(in [Debar et al. 1999], these are called knowledge-based methods). 17
Here “anomaly” is definitely being used in the traditional sense of “error”, whereas
“misuse” has an element of fault diagnosis since error patterns related to previously-
identified intrusions are being searched for (see Figure 7).
normal
behaviour
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observed
behaviour
observed
behaviour
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behaviour
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error report
anomaly detection
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Figure 7 — Detection Paradigms
“Intrusion detection” is thus commonly used in a very broad sense to indicate a set of
system administration tools that provide error detection and some degree of fault
diagnosis (“these errors — anomalies and misuses — were probably due to
intrusions”), and reports these partial conclusions either:
• to a system administrator (the SSO) who might carry out further diagnosis and
initiate appropriate countermeasures and/or litigation, or
• to an automatic countermeasure mechanism.
Given this current broad usage of the term, we will avoid using “intrusion detection”
in the limited sense of “error detection”. However, we will also refrain from including
automatic countermeasures as part of intrusion detection since this notion clearly goes
beyond detection to embrace a form of fault treatment. Instead, we will adopt the
following definition that concords both with current usage and with traditional
dependability concepts:
intrusion detection system: a facility aimed at discovering the presence of
intrusions; the facility consists of a set of sensors or error detectors
(including anomaly and misuse detectors) and an intrusion diagnosis
                                                 
17
 [Halme & Bauer] actually also identifies “hybrid misuse/anomaly detection” and “continuous
system health monitoring”. The former is clearly not a separate form of detection and the latter
can be viewed as a form of anomaly detection, since it applies to “suspicious changes in
system-wide activity measures and system resource usage”.
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mechanism that collates sensor outputs to decide whether the detected
errors are symptomatic of intrusion.
It should be noted that most currently available intrusion detection systems do not
include any intrusion diagnosis mechanisms. The explicit recognition of the fact that
misuses and anomalies are indeed errors that can be caused by any sort of fault is an
initial result of the MAFTIA project. Indeed, a good intrusion detection system
requires such a fault diagnosis mechanism to minimise the rate of false alarms caused
by errors due to other classes of faults (e.g., design faults in the reference for defining
“misuse” or “anomalies”, accidental interaction faults such as mistyping a password,
etc.).
3.3.5 Loss of Confidentiality
There is no equivalent in traditional fault-tolerance of “loss of confidentiality”.
Moreover, loss of confidentiality may be very difficult to detect. Loss of
confidentiality means that some information is present in a place (computer storage,
paper, some user’s brain…) where it should not be. This is an error, i.e., “part of the
system state which may lead to a failure”, the failure being the disclosure of this
information outside the considered system. This error, at least theoretically, can be
detected: the system state is different to what it would be in the absence of error, so
comparison of different copies should detect that. Moreover, if “undetachable” labels
are attached to items of information, it may be possible to detect that this information
should not be where it is, e.g., presence of information labelled as secret in an
unclassified file (the labels form a sort of error-detecting code). As for other errors, a
confidentiality error can be detected by a detected failure (e.g., publication of the
confidential information in a newspaper). The failure may remain undetected (the
information is propagated to unauthorised users, but not published) in the same way
as other failures can remain undetected for a long time (e.g., the Therac system).
Another issue with loss of confidentiality is the inherent difficulty of recovery. Since
a lost secret cannot become secret again, the only apparent way to recover
confidentiality is to substitute a new secret for the lost secret, e.g., by asking a user to
choose a new password (i.e., a form of forward recovery). This can be done pre-
emptively in order to limit the duration of the threat posed by a compromised secret.
3.3.6 Security Guarantees
In this section, we discuss a fundamental restriction on what sort of security
guarantees can be given to system users. To do this, we introduce the notion of a
system access point as an intrusion containment region. This notion is introduced by
analogy with fault containment regions and correctness properties in Byzantine
agreement.
The problem of Byzantine agreement [Lamport et al. 1982] is stated in terms of a
transmitter (the commanding general) and a set of receivers (the lieutenant generals)
to which an order must be sent. The loyal (i.e., non-faulty) generals must agree on the
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order, despite the fact that traitorous (i.e., faulty) generals can alter, delay or otherwise
destroy messages that the agreement protocol requires them to send. Byzantine
agreement is achieved if the following two properties are satisfied:
• All loyal lieutenants obey the same order.
• If the commanding general is loyal, then every loyal lieutenant obeys the order
he sends.
In this example, it is clearly inappropriate to require a disloyal lieutenant to obey the
same order as the loyal lieutenants or to require that loyal lieutenants obey the “order”
of a disloyal commanding general (a disloyal commanding general could give
conflicting orders to different lieutenants). The important issue is that any solution to
the problem should not place any requirement on what an arbitrarily faulty component
may do18. Consequently, correctness of the solution can only be defined with
reference to fault-free components.
When defining the correctness of a mechanism designed to tolerate intrusions, a
similar restriction to fault-free components must apply since no assumptions can be
made about what an intruder or a corrupted component can or cannot do.
An intrusion-tolerant system is aimed at guaranteeing certain security properties,
despite the fact that some components of the system might be compromised, by either
corrupt system administrators or corrupt users. Consider now that users (and
administrators) of the considered computer system access the latter by means of an
“access point”, i.e., a terminal or a workstation (Figure 8).
                                                 
18
 In practice that there is always some assumption about what a faulty component is not allowed
to do in the sense that it should not be able to change the structure of the considered fault-
tolerant system. For example, in Byzantine agreement, a disloyal general is only allowed to
change messages (in arbitrary ways), but is not allowed to kill his colleagues, or to create
clones of himself to falsify the majority.
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Figure 8 — Corrupt vs. Non-corrupt Access Points and Users
If an access point has been corrupted (e.g., by a Trojan horse that logs or modifies
confidential inputs or outputs) then it is clear that the user of that access point cannot
be given any security guarantees (case of users E and I in Figure 8).19 Also, it is of no
interest to give a security guarantee to a corrupt user, even if his access point is non-
corrupt (case of user F in Figure 8). Indeed, from the security viewpoint, a user and
his corresponding access point constitute a single “intrusion containment region” (by
analogy with “fault containment regions” of traditional fault-tolerance20): it is of no
import to the rest of the system whether a user or his access point is corrupt.
Consequently, it is clear that security guarantees can be given only with respect to a
set of non-corrupt access point intrusion containment regions, e.g., access points A, B,
C, D, G and H in Figure 8. For these users, an intrusion-tolerant system should be
able to provide guarantees about the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the
data owned (or, equivalently, the service purchased) by those users, despite the fact
that there are (a certain number of) corrupt components, administrators or users of the
system. A similar concept is introduced in [Pfitzmann & Waidner 1994], where
                                                
19
 The protection of an access point against intrusions should thus be under the responsibility of
the corresponding user: a reckless user cannot be given any security guarantees.
20
 A fault containment region is a set of components that is considered to be atomic from the
point of view of fault-tolerance. See, for example, [Smith 1986].
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security properties are specified in terms of a subset of access points that together
constitute the interface to the concerned parties, i.e., those parties who mutually trust
each other but distrust other parties (other users, access points or system components).
3.3.7 Intrusion Tolerance
In the definitions relative to fault tolerance in Section 3.1.4 a distinction is made
between error processing (error detection, error diagnosis and error recovery), aimed
at preventing errors from leading to (catastrophic) failure, and fault treatment (fault
diagnosis, fault isolation, and reconfiguration), aimed at preventing the recurrence of
errors.
Error detection is a necessary preliminary to achieving backward or forward
recovery, or compensation by switchover, but is not strictly necessary if compensation
is carried out systematically (i.e., fault masking). However, irrespectively of the error
recovery method employed (if any), error detection is necessary if subsequent fault
treatment or curative maintenance actions are to be undertaken.
It is interesting to re-examine these notions when the set of faults to be tolerated
includes intrusions.
By definition, error-processing techniques apply to all errors irrespectively of the
specific faults that caused them. This does not mean that the design of an error-
processing technique is independent of the hypothesised fault model, but it does mean
that the possible recovery actions do not depend on particular faults within that model.
For example, as discussed in Section 3.3.4, misuse detection is a form of error
detection that would be meaningless if the considered fault model did not include
intrusions. However, if the detection of misuse is to trigger an error recovery action,
that action will be triggered even if the detected “misuse” was due, say, to an
accidental power glitch.
Remedial actions that are specific to intrusions can only be carried out when fault
diagnosis has been carried out, to decide whether the detected errors were indeed
caused by intrusions. In the core dependability concepts, these remedial actions are
part of fault treatment. When applied to intrusions, these remedial actions can include
countermeasures such as intrusion isolation (e.g., blocking traffic from a host that is
diagnosed as corrupt) and system reconfiguration (e.g., changing the settings of
firewalls or routers), as well as curative maintenance (e.g., vulnerability removal) and
the initiation of litigation.
The various views of intrusion detection and intrusion tolerance developed in this
section and the previous section are illustrated in Figure 9.
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Figure 9 — Intrusion-detection and Tolerance Framework
The figure shows a component or (sub-)system offering some service over an API to a
higher level component, using the service(s) offered by possible lower level
components. Taking inspiration from the “ideal fault-tolerant component” of
[Anderson & Lee 1981], these top and bottom interfaces include “insecurity signals”
aimed at informing the service user that the service has been (might have been)
compromised.
The considered component may implement fault-tolerance using either a masking
scheme (e.g., the FRS technique, which can compensate errors due to both accidental
faults and intrusions [Fraga & Powell 1985, Rabin 1989, Deswarte et al. 1991, Fabre
et al. 1994]) or an error detection and recovery scheme. Whether masking or
detection-and-recovery is used, detected errors are reported to the fault treatment
facilities, which can be partly internal to the considered component or situated within
a global security administration (sub-)system. The fault-treatment facilities include
means for intrusion diagnosis, intrusion isolation, and automatic or manual system
reconfiguration or intrusion-specific countermeasures.
The considered component may also include other standalone sensors in the form of
misuse, anomaly and other error detectors, in addition to those error detectors
included within any internal fault-tolerance mechanisms. The intrusion-detection
system (in the sense defined in the previous section) consists of the set of all such
sensors, and the intrusion diagnosis mechanisms included within the security
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administration system. The components of the intrusion-detection system are shown
in dark grey.
3.4 Glossary
This glossary is provided as an aid to reading this chapter. It should
not be considered independently of the body of the chapter.
For some terms, only dictionary definitions have been given. It was
felt necessary to include these terms in the glossary, but the
corresponding definitions are particularly subject to change after
further scientific discussion.
Some terms, indicated by the symbol ‘ = ’, are not directly relevant to
this chapter. These might have to be moved elsewhere in (or deleted
from) the next version of the reference model.
access control: the prevention of use of a resource by unidentified and/or
unauthorised entities in any other than an authorised manner
[ECMA TR/46] ; the determination as to whether a requested access to an
information item is to be granted or denied; see also, authorisation.
accidental: unintentional.
accountability: availability and integrity of some meta-information related to
an operation (e.g., identity of the user realising the operation, time of the
operation, etc.).
admissible evidence = : see evidence (admissible ~).
anonymisation: process that gives confidence in anonymity.
anonymity: confidentiality of the identity of a person, e.g., who has realised an
operation, or has not realised an operation.
attack: an intrusion attempt.
auditability: availability and integrity of some meta-information related to all
operations.
authentic: of undisputed origin, genuine [OMED 1992].
authentication: process which gives confidence in authenticity.
authenticity: integrity of some information and meta-information; integrity of
the meta-information representing the link between some information and
its origin (e.g., the meta-information relating the claimed identity of a
subject to the real identity of the subject).
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authorisation: the granting of access to a security object [ECMA TR/46]; the
determination as to whether a requested operation is to be granted or
denied, according to the security policy; see also, access control.
availability : dependability with respect to the readiness for usage [Laprie
1992]; measure of correct service delivery with respect to the alternation
between correct service and incorrect service [Laprie 1992].
component (system ~): another system, which is part of the considered system
[Laprie 1992].
confidentiality: dependability with respect to the non-occurrence of
unauthorised information disclosure.
correct service: see service (correct ~).
coverage: measure of the representativeness of the situations to which a system
is submitted during its validation compared to the actual situations it will
be confronted with during its operational life [Laprie 1992].
dependability: property of a computer system such that reliance can be
justifiably placed on the service it delivers [Laprie 1995].
dependence: the state of being dependent on other support [OMED 1992];
reliance, trust, confidence [OMED 1992].
dependent: depending, conditional or subordinate [OMED 1992].
effort = : an expense (of bodily or mental energy) to achieve a desired end
[LMED 1976].
error: part of the state of a system liable to lead to failure [Laprie 1992].
manifestation of a fault in a system [Laprie 1992].
event: a thing that happens or takes place [OMED 1992]; a change in state.
evidence (admissible ~) = : (law) evidence that can be taken into account in
court.
evidence (irrefutable ~) = : (law) evidence that cannot be refuted, i.e., proven
wrong.
failure: event occurring when the delivered service deviates from fulfilling the
system function [Laprie et al. 1998]; transition from correct service to
incorrect service [Laprie 1992].
failure model: a fault model defined in terms of the failures of the components
of a system.
false negative: the event corresponding to the occurrence of an intrusion that is
not detected as such by an intrusion detection system (i.e., no alarm raised
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due to a lack of coverage, including excessive latency); also called a
“miss”.
false positive: the event corresponding to an alarm generated by an intrusion
detection system in the absence of intrusion (i.e., a false alarm).
fault: adjudged or hypothesised cause of an error [Laprie 1992]; error cause
which is intended to be avoided or tolerated [Laprie 1992]; consequence
for a system of the failure of another system which has interacted or is
interacting with the considered system [Laprie 1992].
fault forecasting: see forecasting (fault ~).
fault model: set of assumptions about the faults that are taken into account
during fault prevention, tolerance, removal or forecasting.
fault prevention: see prevention (fault ~).
fault removal: see removal (fault ~).
fault tolerance: see tolerance (fault ~).
forecasting (fault ~): methods and techniques aimed at estimating the present
number, the future incidence, and the consequences of faults [Laprie et al.
1998].
identity: representation of a person in a system.
incorrect service: see service (incorrect ~).
insider: a human user authorised to perform some of a set of specified
operations on a set of specified objects, i.e., a user whose (current)
privilege intersects the considered domain of object-operation pairs.
insider intrusion: see intrusion (insider ~).
insurance = : a measure taken to provide for a possible contingency [OMED
1992].
integrity: dependability with respect to the non-occurrence of inadequate
information alterations [Laprie et al. 1998].
intentional: voluntary, deliberate.
intrusion: a malicious interaction fault resulting from an attack that has been (at
least partially) successful in exploiting a vulnerability.
intrusion (insider ~): an abuse of privilege or misfeasance, i.e., an improper
use of authorised operations.
intrusion (outsider ~): an unauthorised increase in privilege, i.e., a change in
the privilege of a user that is not permitted by the system’s security policy.
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intrusion detection system: a facility aimed at discovering the presence of
intrusions; the facility consists of a set of sensors or error detectors
(including anomaly and misuse detectors) and an intrusion diagnosis
mechanism that collates sensor outputs to decide whether the detected
errors are symptomatic of intrusion.
irrefutable evidence = : see evidence (irrefutable ~).
liability = : the state of being liable [OMED 1992]; legal or financial
responsibility.
liable = : legally bound [OMED 1992].
malicious: intending or intended to do harm [OMED 1992].
misfeasance: the illegal or improper performance of an action in itself lawful
[LMED 1976]; an intrusion through the abuse of privilege.
object: information container.
outsider: a human user not authorised to perform any of a set of specified
operations on a set of specified objects, i.e., a user whose (current)
privilege does not intersect the considered domain of object-operation
pairs.
outsider intrusion: see (intrusion, outsider ~).
prevention (fault ~): methods and techniques aimed at preventing fault
occurrence or introduction [Laprie et al. 1998].
privacy: confidentiality of personal information.
privilege: set of rights of a subject.
removal (fault ~): methods and techniques aimed at reducing the presence
(number, seriousness) of faults[Laprie et al. 1998].
responsibility: the state of being responsible [OMED 1992].
responsible: obliged to account; being the cause of; accountable for.
rights: a subject has a given right on a specified object if and only if he is
authorised to perform a specified operation on that object; elements of a
subject’s privilege.
security: dependability with respect to the prevention of unauthorised access
and/or handling of information [Laprie 1992]; the combination of
confidentiality, integrity and availability.
security policy : description of 1) the security properties which are to be
fulfilled by a computing system; 2) the rules according to which the
system security state can evolve.
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service (correct ~): service that fulfils the system function [Laprie et al. 1998].
service (incorrect ~): service that does not fulfil the system function [Laprie et
al. 1998].
service: system behaviour as perceived by a system user [Laprie 1992].
state (system ~): a condition of being with respect to a set of circumstances
[Laprie 1992].
subject: active entity in a computer system — a process is a subject, a human
user is also a subject.
system: entity having interacted, interacting or able to interact with other
entities [Laprie 1992]; set of components bound together in order to
interact [Laprie 1992].
system function: that for which the system is intended [Laprie et al. 1998].
system user: see user (system ~).
tolerance (fault ~): methods and techniques aimed at providing a correct
service in spite of faults (adapted from [Laprie et al. 1998]).
trust: reliance on the truth of a statement etc. without examination [OMED
1992].
trusted: adjective to describe a statement etc. on which trust has been placed.
user (system ~): another system (physical, human) interacting with the
considered system.
value = : the worth, desirability, or utility of a thing [OMED 1992]21.
vulnerability: an accidental fault, or a malicious or non-malicious intentional
fault, in the requirements, the specification, the design or the configuration
of the system, or in the way it is used, that could be exploited to create an
intrusion.
                                                 
21
 If this notion is really needed, it would be better to use the term worth instead of value, in
order to avoid confusion with value as used in value domain, value failure, etc.
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Chapter 4 Conceptual Models
4.1 Introduction
R. J. Stroud, University of Newcastle upon Tyne (UK)
This chapter consists of a series of conceptual models describing different aspects of a
secure distributed information system. These models are largely orthogonal but no
attempt has yet been made to unify them. Together these conceptual models constitute
a first version of the MAFTIA reference model, which will be used to inform the
subsequent work of the project, including the development of the MAFTIA
architecture in work package 2.
The first conceptual model is concerned with the failure model. It deals with the
different failure assumptions, both from the system perspective and the user
perspective. The second conceptual model is concerned with the issue of synchrony
and proposes that the architecture should be based on the notion of a Trusted Timely
Computing Base, a mechanism for guaranteeing system timeliness properties despite
the presence of malicious faults. The third conceptual model is the topological model.
It deals with issues of locality and scaling in a potentially global network
environment. In particular, it distinguishes the different characteristics of local area
networks, enterprise networks, and the global Internet. The fourth conceptual model
builds on these foundations and characterises the kinds of services that will be
provided by the MAFTIA middleware. These include basic cryptography and group
communication protocols as well as more application oriented services such as trusted
third party, timestamping and distributed authentication.
The remaining conceptual models are more abstract and are concerned with notions of
trust, responsibility, accountability, and communication. The trust based verification
model explores the nature of proof for a cryptographic system and identifies where
trust is required in the verification process. The responsibility model discusses the
nature of responsibility and delegation in an organisation, thus providing some insight
into the problem of a corrupt insider exceeding his or her authority. Finally, the inter-
agent communication model explores the nature of communication and identifies the
different levels of meaning at which a failure can occur.
4.2 Failure Model
P. Verissimo, Universidade de Lisboa (P)
A crucial aspect of any architecture is the failure model upon which the system
architecture is conceived, and component interactions are defined. The failure model
conditions the correctness analysis, both in the value and time domains, and dictates
crucial aspects of system configuration, such as the placement and choice of
components, level of redundancy, types of algorithms, and so forth. There are
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essentially two different kinds of failure model: controlled failure assumptions; and
arbitrary failure assumptions.
4.2.1 Failure Assumptions
Controlled failure assumptions specify qualitative and quantitative bounds on
component failures. For example, the failure assumptions may specify that
components only have timing failures, and that no more than f components fail during
an interval of reference. Alternatively, they can admit value failures, but not allow
components to spontaneously generate or forge messages, nor impersonate, collude
with, or send conflicting information to other components. This approach is extremely
realistic, since it represents very well how common systems work under the presence
of accidental faults, failing in a benign manner most of the time. It can be extrapolated
to malicious faults, by assuming that they are qualitatively and quantitatively limited.
However, it is traditionally difficult to model the behaviour of a hacker, so we have a
problem of coverage that does not recommend this approach unless a solution can be
found.
Arbitrary failure assumptions specify no qualitative or quantitative bounds on
component failures. Obviously, this should be understood in the context of a universe
of “possible” failures of the concerned operation mode of the component. For
example, the possible failure modes of interaction, between components of a
distributed system are limited to combinations of timeliness, form, meaning, and
target of those interactions (let us call them messages). In this context, an arbitrary
failure means the capability of generating a message at any time, with whatever
syntax and semantics (form and meaning), and sending it to anywhere in the system.
Moreover, practical systems based on arbitrary failure assumptions very often specify
quantitative bounds on component failures, or at least equate tradeoffs between
resilience of their solutions and the number of failures eventually produced [Babaõglu
1987]. Arbitrary failure assumptions are costly to handle, in terms of performance and
complexity, and thus are not compatible with the user requirements of the vast
majority of today’s on-line applications.
Hybrid assumptions combining both kinds of failure assumptions would be desirable.
They are a known framework in dependable system design vis-à-vis accidental
failures [Meyer & Pradhan 1987] [Powell et al. 1988] [Verissimo et al. 1997].
Generally, they consist of allocating different assumptions to different subsets or
components of the system, and have been used in a number of systems and protocols.
Hybrid models allow stronger assumptions to be made about parts of the system that
can justifiably be assumed to exhibit fail-controlled behaviour, whilst other parts of
the system are still allowed an arbitrary behaviour. This is advantageous in modular
and distributed system architectures such as MAFTIA. However, it is only feasible
when the model is well-founded, that is, the behaviour of every single subset of the
system can be modelled and/or enforced with high coverage, and this brings us back,
at least for parts of the system, to the problem identified for controlled failure
assumptions.
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4.2.2 Composite Failure Model
The problems identified in our discussion of failure assumptions point to the need for
the MAFTIA failure model to have characteristics enabling the definition of
intermediate, hybrid assumptions, with adequate coverage. A first step in this
direction is the definition of a composite failure model specifically aimed at
representing the failures that may result from several classes of malicious faults. A
second step is the definition of a set of techniques that act at different points within
this composite failure model and which, combined in several ways, yield
dependability vis-à-vis particular classes of faults. We are going to base our reasoning
on two guiding principles:
- the sequence: attack + vulnerability fi intrusion fi  failure
- the recursive use of fault tolerance and fault prevention
Concerning the mechanisms of failure, Figure 10 represents the fundamental
sequence: attack + vulnerability fi  intrusion fi  failure. It distinguishes between
several kinds of faults capable of contributing to a security failure. Recalling the
definitions made in Chapter 3, vulnerabilities are the primordial faults existing inside
the components, essentially design or configuration faults (e.g., coding faults allowing
program stack overflow, files with root setuid in UNIX, naïve passwords, unprotected
TCP/IP ports). Attacks are malicious interaction faults that attempt to activate one or
more of those vulnerabilities (e.g., port scans, email viruses, malicious Java applets or
ActiveX controls). An attack that successfully activates a vulnerability causes an
intrusion. This further step towards failure is normally characterized by an erroneous
state in the system that may take several forms (e.g., an unauthorized privileged
account with telnet access, a system file with undue access permissions to the hacker).
Such erroneous states can be unveiled by intrusion detection, as we will see ahead, but
if nothing is done to process the errors resulting from the intrusion, failure of one or
more security properties will occur.
Figure 10 — The Composite Failure Model of MAFTIA
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The composite model embraced in MAFTIA allows the combined introduction of
several techniques. Note that two causes concur to create an intrusion, as shown in
Figure 10: vulnerabilities and attacks.
To begin with, we can prevent some attacks from occurring, thereby reducing the
level of threat imposed on the system. Attack prevention can be performed, for
example, by selectively filtering access to parts of the system (e.g., if a component is
behind a firewall and cannot be accessed from the Internet, it cannot be attacked from
there). However, it is impossible to prevent all attacks (e.g., some components have to
be placed outside the firewall in a Demilitarised Zone22), and in consequence, other
measures must be taken.
On the vulnerability side, vulnerability prevention helps to reduce the degree of
vulnerability by construction. However, many systems are assembled from COTS
components that contain known vulnerabilities. When it is not possible to prevent the
attack(s) that would activate these vulnerabilities, a first step would be to attempt
vulnerability removal. Sometimes this is done at the cost of eliminating the system
functions that contain the vulnerabilities. The above-mentioned approaches can be
complemented, still at the attack level, with tolerance measures achieved by
combinations of the classic techniques: detection, recovery, and masking. The
detection of port scans or other anomalous activity at the external border of the system
forms part of the functionality of some systems generically known as Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS). Although an intrusion has not yet occurred, there is an
erroneous symptom that can be addressed by several attack countermeasures. For
example, honey-pots and other evasive measures at the periphery of the system can be
used to mask the effects of the attack.
The various combinations of techniques discussed above provide a range of
alternatives for achieving intrusion prevention (see Figure 10), i.e. attempting to avoid
the occurrence of intrusions. Whilst this is a valid and widely used approach, its
absolute success cannot be guaranteed in all situations, and for all systems. The
reason is obvious: it may not be possible to handle all attacks, either because not all
attacks are known or new ones may appear, or because not all attacks can be
guaranteed to be detected or masked. Similar reasoning applies to vulnerabilities. In
consequence, some attacks will succeed in producing intrusions, requiring forms of
intrusion tolerance, as shown in the right part of Figure 10, in order to prevent system
failure. Again, these can assume several forms: detection (e.g., of intruded account
activity, of Trojan horse activity); recovery (e.g., interception and neutralization of
intruder activity); or masking (e.g., voting between several components, including a
minority of intruded ones).
                                                 
22
 A Demilitarized Zone is an area typically outside the inner protection perimeter of the
firewall, and sometimes between an outer and an inner firewall, where public servers are
placed.
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The above discussion has laid the foundations for achieving our objective: a well-
founded hybrid failure model, that is, one where different components have different
faulty behaviours. Consider a component for which a given controlled failure
assumption was made. How can we achieve coverage of such an assumption, given
the unpredictability of attacks and the elusiveness of vulnerabilities? The key is in a
recursive use of fault tolerance and fault prevention. Think of the component as a
system: it can be constructed through the combined use of removal of internal
vulnerabilities, prevention of some attacks, and implementation of intrusion tolerance
mechanisms internal to the component, in order to prevent the component from
exhibiting failures.
Looked upon from the outside now, at the next higher level of abstraction, the level of
the outer system, the would-be component failures we prevented restrict the system
faults the component can produce. In fact we have performed fault prevention, that is,
we have a component with a controlled behaviour vis-à-vis malicious faults. This
principle:
• establishes a divide-and-conquer strategy for building modular fault-tolerant
systems;
• can be applied in different ways to any component;
• can be applied recursively at as many levels of abstraction as are found to be
useful.
Components exhibit a coverage that is justifiably given by the techniques used in their
implementation, and can subsequently be used in the construction of fault-tolerant
protocols under the hybrid failure model.
Since we are dealing with systems of interacting components we should also address
error confinement. Errors can propagate from one component to another when
messages are sent from one component to another component. One approach to
confining errors is to replicate components, and apply a message selection protocol
that validates the messages generated by the replicated components before they are
propagated. The selection protocol cross-checks each message against equivalent data
messages generated by the other replicas and only sends messages that the majority of
replicas agree upon. Thus, messages are only propagated if the replicas reach a
consensus about them. The drawback of this validate-before-propagate [Powell 1991]
approach is that every replica must agree to send a message, so propagation is limited
by the slowest replica in the group. A more efficient approach is propagate-before-
validate [Powell 1991]. With this approach the first replica to generate a message
propagates the message to other components without any validation taking place.
However, at some later point the computation being carried out by the components is
suspended until all previous computation is validated. One plausible implementation
approach would be to use a transactional framework. All interacting components
would join a transaction and before commitment could take place, all message
sending would be suspended and all messages sent during the transaction would be
validated by cross-checking the messages generated by component replicas. If any of
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the messages were invalid then the transaction would be aborted and rollback would
take place, otherwise the transaction would be committed and the effects of the
message interchange made permanent.
This approach was originally developed for components that were active replicas. We
would like to apply the concept to general components. However, standard
transactional frameworks are unsuitable for this as they support only backward error
recovery and a general component may not support rollback. Therefore the framework
used for error confinement should support forward recovery techniques as well as
backward recovery techniques. The coordinated atomic actions (CA actions) concept
[Xu et al. 1995] [Xu et al. 1999] may offer a suitable framework. CA actions are
intended for cooperating or competing general components involved in a joint
interaction and impose strong controls on error confinement and error recovery
activities in the event of failure. The implementation of the CA action mechanism
would need to be made both fault tolerant and secure to be used as a framework for
error confinement in a intrusion tolerant system. Therefore, as part of the MAFTIA
project we intend to investigate the usefulness of an extended concept of CA actions
for error confinement
4.3 Synchrony Model
P. Verissimo, Universidade de Lisboa (P)
Research in distributed systems algorithms has traditionally been based on one of two
canonical models: fully asynchronous and fully synchronous models [Verissimo &
Raynal 2000]. Asynchronous models do not allow timeliness specifications. They are
time-free, that is, they are characterized by an absolute independence of time, and
distributed systems based on such models typically have the following characteristics:
Pa 1 Unbounded or unknown processing delays
Pa 2 Unbounded or unknown message delivery delays
Pa 3 Unbounded or unknown rate of drift of local clocks
Pa 4 Unbounded or unknown difference of local clocks23
Asynchronous models obviously resist timing attacks, i.e. attacks on the timing
assumptions of the model, which are non-existent in this case. However, because of
their time-free nature, asynchronous models cannot solve timed problems. For
example, they cannot address Quality of Service (QoS) specifications, which are of
increasing importance in the measure of the quality of transactional systems in open
                                                 
23 Pa3  and Pa4 are essentially equivalent but are listed for a better comparison with the
synchronous model characteristics listed below. Since a local clock in a time-free system is
nothing more than a sequence counter, clock synchronization is also impossible in an
asynchronous system.
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networks such as the Internet (e.g., stock exchange, e-commerce). They cannot reason
in terms of time, either relative or absolute, which dictates a lot of the functionality of
interactive applications. In addition, asynchronous models preclude the deterministic
solution of interesting problems, such as consensus or Byzantine agreement [Fischer
et al. 1985]: only probabilistic solutions work in this case. Besides, the only way
asynchronous models can reason in terms of causality between events is in a logical
way, and this is insufficient if hidden communication channels exist between
participants. Causality or cause-effect order is a crucial factor of correctness in some
interactive and competitive applications, such as on-line operations on the stock
market. “False” asynchronous algorithms have been deployed over the years,
exhibiting subtle but real failures, thanks to the inappropriate use of timeouts in a
supposedly time-free model.
In practice, many of the emerging applications we see today, particularly on the
Internet, have interactivity or mission-criticality requirements. That is, service must
be provided on time, either because of user-dictated quality-of-service requirements
(e.g., network transaction servers, multimedia rendering, synchronized groupware), or
because of dependability constraints (e.g., air traffic control). Synchronous models
allow timeliness specifications. In this type of model, it is possible to solve all hard
problems (e.g., consensus, atomic broadcast, clock synchronization) [Chandra &
Toueg 1996]. In consequence, such models solve timed problem specifications, one
precondition for at least a subset of the applications targeted in MAFTIA, for the
reasons explained above. Synchronous models have the following characteristics:
Ps 1 There exists a known bound for processing delays
Ps 2 There exists a known bound for message delivery delays
Ps 3 There exists a known bound for the rate of drift of local clocks
Ps 4 There exists a known bound for the difference among local clocks
However, synchronous models are fragile in terms of the coverage of timeliness
assumptions such as: positioning of events in the timeline and determining execution
durations. Indeed, to achieve these characteristics, some additional timing
assumptions must be made concerning the behaviour of the system with regard to
component failures. These timing bounds are assumed to be valid for correct
processes, and conversely their achievement must not be disturbed by incorrect
processes. It is easy to see that synchronous models are susceptible to timing attacks,
since they make strong assumptions about things happening on time. For example,
algorithms based on messages arriving by a certain time, or on reading the actual
global time from a clock, may fail in dangerous ways if manipulated by an adversary
[Gong 1992]. Likewise, causal delivery order of messages or event trace analysis
based on physical timestamps may be disturbed to the advantage of a hacker who, for
example, manipulates the time-stamping facility.
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4.3.1 Partial Synchrony
The introductory words above explain why synchronism is more than a mere
circumstantial attribute in distributed systems subjected to malicious faults: absence
of time is detrimental to quality of service; presence of time increases vulnerability.
Restrictions to the asynchrony of time-free systems have been addressed in earlier
studies [Dolev et al. 1987, Dwork et al. 1988], but timed partially synchronous
models have deservedly received great attention recently. These intermediate models
provide better results, essentially for three reasons: (i) they allow timeliness
specifications; (ii) they admit failure of those specifications; (iii) they provide timing
failure detection.
We are particularly interested in a model based on the existence of a timely computing
base, which is both a timely execution assistant and a timing failure detection oracle
that ensures time-domain correctness of applications in environments of uncertain
synchronism [Verissimo et al. 2000]. The timely computing base model addresses a
broader spectrum of problems than those solved by previous timed partially
synchronous models, such as the quasi-synchronous [Veríssimo & Almeida 1995] and
the timed-asynchronous models [Cristian & Fetzer 1998]. All these works share the
same observation: synchronism or asynchronism are not homogeneous properties of
systems. That is, they vary with time, and they vary with the part of the system being
considered. However, each model has treated these asymmetries in its own way: some
relied on the evolution of synchronism with time, others with space or with both;
synchronism assumptions were not totally transparent to applications; and
architectural constructs were rarely used to enforce these assumptions. In the timely
computing base model, it is assumed that systems have an architecture such that
applications, however asynchronous they may be and whatever their scale, can rely on
services provided by a special module which is timely and reliable.
Research in this area has focused on benign (non-arbitrary, non-malicious) failure
models. However, the architectural characteristics of the timely computing base
enables the model to be extended so as to be resilient to value- as well as time-domain
failures.
This would contribute to supporting what we described earlier as a hybrid failure
model, encompassing malicious faults whilst guaranteeing system timeliness in a
much more robust way than fully synchronous models would. In essence, the timely
computing base must follow a few construction principles that guarantee its behaviour
in the face of faults:
• Interposition: it must by construction be interposed between vital resources and
any attempt to interact with them.
• Shielding: it must be shielded (tamperproof) from any contamination by the rest
of the system.
•  Validation: it must be verifiable, in order to ensure very high coverage of its
properties.
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We call such an extended model, whose development we will pursue in the MAFTIA
project, a Trusted Timely Computing Base, or TTCB. In one sense, a TTCB has
similar design principles to the very well known paradigm in security of a Trusted
Computing Base (TCB) [Abrams et al. 1995]. However, the objectives are drastically
different. A TCB aims at fault prevention and ensures that the whole application state
and resources are tamper-proof. It is based on logical correctness and makes no
attempt to reason in terms of time. In contrast, a TTCB aims at fault tolerance:
application components can be tampered with, but the whole application should not
fail. In other words, a TTCB is an architectural artefact supporting the construction
and trusted execution of fault-tolerant protocols and applications running under a
partially synchronous model.
The architecture of a system with a TTCB is suggested by Figure 11. The first
relevant aspect is that the heterogeneity of system properties is incorporated into the
system architecture. There is a generic or payload system, over a global network or
payload channel. This prefigures what is normally “the system” in homogeneous
architectures, that is, the place where the protocols and applications run. The latter can
have any degree of synchronism, and be subjected to arbitrary attacks. Additionally,
there is a control part, made of local TTCB modules, interconnected by some form of
medium, the control channel. We will refer to this set up as the distributed TTCB, or
simply TTCB when there is no ambiguity. The second relevant aspect of the TTCB is
that its well-defined properties are preserved by construction, regardless of the
properties of applications running with its assistance: it is synchronous, and it is
trusted to execute as specified, being resilient to intrusions.
P
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Figure 11 — Trusted Timely Computing Base Model
Unlike the classic TCB, the TTCB can be a fairly modest and simple component of
the system, used as an assistant for parts of the execution of the payload protocols and
applications. Moreover, depending on the type of application, it is not necessary that
all sites have a local TTCB. Consider the development of a fault-tolerant TTP
(Trusted Third Party) based on a group of replicas that collectively ensure the correct
behaviour of the TTP service vis-à-vis malicious faults. One possibility is for the
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replica group activity to be based on algorithms that support an arbitrary failure
assumptions model (e.g., asynchronous randomized Byzantine Agreement), with the
corresponding penalty in performance and lack of timeliness. Alternatively, the
replica group management may rely on simpler algorithms that are at least partially
executed in a synchronous subsystem with a benign (intrusion-free) failure model.
Running these parts of the algorithm on a distributed TTCB substantiates the coverage
of these assumptions.
A TTCB should be built in a way that secures both the synchronism properties
mentioned earlier, and its correct behaviour vis-à-vis malicious faults. In
consequence, a local TTCB can be either a special hardware module, such as a
tamperproof device, an auxiliary firmware-based microcomputer board, or a software-
based real-time and security kernel running on a plain desktop machine such as a PC
or workstation. Likewise, a distributed TTCB assumes the existence of a timely inter-
module communication channel. This channel can assume several forms exhibiting
different levels of timeliness and resilience. It may or not be based on a physically
different network from the one supporting the payload channel. Virtual channels with
predictable timing characteristics coexisting with essentially asynchronous channels
are feasible in some current networks, even over the Internet [Schulzrinne et al.
1996]. Such virtual channels can be made secure through virtual private network
(VPN) techniques, which consist of building secure cryptographic IP tunnels linking
all TTCB modules together, and these techniques are now supported by standards
[Kent & Atkinson 1998]. On a timeliness side, it should be observed that the
bandwidth required of the control channel is bound to be much smaller than that of
the payload channel. In more demanding scenarios, one may resort to alternative
networks (real-time LAN, ISDN connection, GSM or UMTS Short Message Service,
Low Earth Orbit satellite communication).
A TTCB also allows partial synchrony to be explored from a time-free perspective. A
time-free approach is necessary when the criticality of operations is such that an
arbitrary failure assumptions model is needed to maximize coverage and prevent
timing attacks by resorting to an asynchronous model. However, this setting does not
offer timeliness guarantees and that would be the price to pay. The optimistic
synchrony model that we intend to pursue in the MAFTIA project attempts to
improve on this situation. A fully asynchronous model is assumed as a baseline
framework for constructing probabilistic malicious-fault resilient building blocks, for
example, randomized Byzantine agreement. However, whenever the system exhibits
enough synchrony, the system switches to the partially synchronous versions of those
building blocks, still malicious-fault resilient, but exhibiting better performance.
4.4 Topological Model
P. Verissimo, Universidade de Lisboa (P)
Previous work on large-scale open distributed systems has shown the value of
topology awareness in the construction of efficient protocols [Rodrigues & Verissimo
2000], from both functionality and performance viewpoints. The principle is
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explained very simply: (i) the topology of the system is set up in ways that may
enhance its properties; (ii) protocols and mechanisms in general are designed in order
to recognize system topology and take advantage from it. This is achieved both by
creating adequate physical topologies (the part of the system under the control of the
organization, e.g., the local networks) and by logically reorganizing existing physical
topologies (the part of the system outside the control of the organization, e.g. the
Internet).
We intend to extrapolate the virtues of topology awareness to security in the MAFTIA
architecture, through a few principles for introducing topological constructs that
facilitate the combined implementation of malicious fault tolerance and fault
prevention. The first principle is to use topology to facilitate separation of concerns:
the site-participant separation in the internal structure of system hosts separates
communication from processing; and the WAN-of-LANs duality at network level
separates communication amongst local aggregates of sites, which we call facilities,
from long-haul communication amongst facilities. The second principle is to use
topology to construct clustering in a natural way. Two points of clustering seem
natural in the MAFTIA large-scale architecture: sites and facilities. We clarify these
principles in the next sections.
4.4.1 Sites and Participants
The MAFTIA architecture supports interactions among entities in different hosts (e.g.
processes, tasks, etc.). We call them generically participants. Participants, which
execute distributed activities, can be senders or recipients of information, or both, in
the course of the aforementioned activities. The local topology of hosts is such that
they are divided into a site part, which connects to the network and takes care of all
inter-host operations, i.e., communication, and a participant part, which takes care of
all distributed activities and relies on the services provided by the site-part modules.
Participants interact via the respective site part, which handles all communication
aspects on behalf of the former, as represented in Figure 12. From now on, we will
refer to sites, when taking the communication/networking viewpoint on the system,
and we will refer to participants, when taking the activity/processing viewpoint.
Site A
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Figure 12 — Site-participant Duality
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A system built according to the site-participant duality model provides a framework
for defining realms of different synchrony, reliability and security. For example, intra-
site communication can be assumed to have better properties of synchrony and
reliability with regard to both accidental and malicious faults, in contrast with inter-
site communication. In consequence, while site failure detection is unreliable in a
network of uncertain synchronism, participant failures can be reliably detected.
Likewise, different assumptions can be made concerning trustworthiness of the
participant and site parts.
4.4.2 The Two-tier WAN-of-LANs
The global topology of the networking infrastructure is seen as a logical two-tier
WAN-of-LANs. Large-scale computing infrastructures exhibit what appears to be a
two-tier organization: pools of sites with privately managed high connectivity links,
such as LANs or MANs or ATM fabrics, interconnected in the upper tier by a
publicly managed point-to-point global network (e.g., the Internet). More concretely,
we mean that the global network runs standard, de jure or de facto, protocols whilst
each local network is run by a single, private, entity24, and can thus run specific
protocols alongside standard protocols.
Again, this structure offers opportunities for making different assumptions regarding
the types and levels of threat and degrees of vulnerability of the local network versus
the global network part. Incidentally, this does not necessarily mean considering intra-
facility networking threat-free. For example, certain port scans or pings in the global
network may mean absolutely nothing, whereas they may mean an attack if performed
inside the facility. On the other hand, an intruder working from the inside of the
facility may have considerably more power than one working from the outside.
4.4.3 Clustering
Clustering seems one of the most promising techniques to cope with large-scale
distributed systems, providing the means to implement effective divide-and-conquer
strategies. Whilst this enhances scalability and performance, it also provides hooks for
the combined implementation of fault-tolerant mechanisms (e.g., cryptographic group
management protocols) and fault-preventive protection strategies (e.g., firewalls). We
identify at least two clustering opportunities: (i) the Facility as a cluster of nodes, or
more appropriately sites, if seen from the viewpoint of the network; (ii) the Site as a
cluster of participants, the ones that reside in the relevant node.
                                                 
24 E.g.: bridged LAN compound of a university campus, MAN of a large industrial complex,
LAN of a regional company department.
Reference Model and Use Cases
70
Facility
 Gateway
Facility
 GatewayGlobal
Network
PP
Site
P
P
P
Site
Site
Site Site
  Local
Network
  Local
Network
  Facility   Facility
Facility
 Gateway
Facility
 Gateway ATM
Figure 13 — Two-tier WAN-of-LANs and Clustering
The first clustering level is obviously compatible with the two-tier architecture
identified in the previous section, and is illustrated in Figure 13. Clustering sites that
coexist in the same local network can simplify inter-network addressing,
communication and administration of these nodes. These sites are hidden behind a
single entry-point, a Facility Gateway, a logical gateway that represents the local
network members, for the global network. The second level of clustering consists of
taking advantage of a multiplying factor between the number of sites and the
(sometimes large) number of participants that are active in communication.
Organization-dependent clustering allows specific protocols to be run behind the
Facility Gateways, without conflicting with the need to use standard protocols in
wide-area networking. Global network communication is then performed essentially
among Facility Gateways. From a security viewpoint, participant-site clustering
allows investing in the implementation of fault-tolerant and fault-preventive
mechanisms at node level to collectively serve the applications residing in the node.
On the other hand, the opportunities offered by site-facility clustering with regard to
security are manifold: firewalling at the Facility Gateway; establishing inter-facility
secure tunnels ending in the facility agents; inspecting incoming and outgoing traffic
for attack and intrusion detection; ingress and egress traffic filtering; internal topology
hiding through network address translation, etc.
4.4.4 Recursivity
The view we have just presented can be recursively applied, in order to represent
very-large-scale organizations. On an intra-facility level, further hierarchies, namely
those already deriving from hierarchical organization of subnetworks and domains,
are not precluded, if the Facility Gateway role is respected. Protocols can easily take
advantage of further topology refinements. On an intra-organization level, the
topology depicted in Figure 13 can be instantiated as representing an organization
with multiple geographically dispersed facilities interconnected by secure tunnels
whose end points are the Facility Gateways. The only role of the Facility Gateways is
to implement the Virtual Private Network (VPN) that ensures this internal
communication, so they would be better named as Internal Facility Gateways.
However, the organization still needs to be connected to the Internet. On an inter-
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organization level, Figure 13 can be re-instantiated with each top-level facility at the
organisational level now representing multiple inter-organizational facilities
interconnected through Internet Facility Gateways. Communication with other
organizations through the Internet is ensured through normal gateways, i.e., External
Facility Gateways. On an extra-organizational level, the Facility Gateway, which is a
logical entity and does not necessarily correspond to a single machine, offers the
necessary services, such as incoming email, web presence, e-commerce, and so forth,
implemented by extranet-based servers, serving potentially many thousands of clients.
4.4.5 System Components
The architecture of a MAFTIA node is represented in Figure 14, in which the local
topology and the dependence relations between modules are depicted by the
orientation of the (“depends-on”) arrows. In Figure 14 the set of layers is divided into
site and participant parts. The site part has access to and depends on a physical
networking infrastructure, not represented for simplicity. The participant part offers
support to local participants engaging in distributed computations. The lowest layer is
the Multipoint Network module, MN, created over the physical infrastructure. Its main
properties are the provision of multipoint addressing and a moderate best-effort error
recovery ability, both depending on topology and site liveness information. The MN
layer hides the particulars of the underlying network to which a given site is directly
attached, and is as thin as the intrinsic properties of the latter allow.
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Figure 14 — Architecture of a MAFTIA Node
In the site part, the Site Failure Detector module, SF, is in charge of assessing the
connectivity and correctness of sites, and the Multipoint Network module depends on
this information. The SF module depends on the network to perform its job, and thus
is not completely reliable, due to the uncertain synchrony and susceptibility to attacks
of at least parts of the network. The universe of sites being monitored can be
parameterized, for example: all sites inside a facility, all sites having to do with
ongoing computations at this site, all facility agents, etc. The Site Membership
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module, SM, depends on information given by the SF module. It creates and modifies
the membership (registered members) and the view (currently active, or non-failed, or
trusted members) of sets of sites, which we call site-groups. The Communication
Support Services module, CS, implements basic cryptographic primitives (e.g., secure
channels and envelopes), Byzantine agreement, group communication with several
reliability and ordering guarantees, clock synchronization, and other core services.
The CS module depends on information given by the SM module about the
composition of the groups, and on the MN module to access the network.
In the participant part, the Participant Failure Detector module, PF, assesses the
liveness of all local participants, based on local information provided by sensors in the
operating system support. The Participant Membership module, PM, performs similar
operations as the SM, on the membership and view of participant groups. Note that
several participant groups, or simply groups, may exist in a single site. The site-
participant clustering and separation of concerns stated earlier is thus implemented by
making a separation between groups of participants (performing distributed
activities), and site-groups of the sites where those participants reside (performing
reliable communication on behalf of the latter). Clustering can be further enhanced by
mapping more than one group onto the same site-group, in what are called lightweight
groups [Rodrigues et al. 1996]. The PM module monitors all groups with local
members, depending on information propagated by the SM and by the PF modules,
and operating cooperatively with the corresponding modules in the concerned remote
sites. The Activity Support Services module, AS, implements building blocks that
assist participant activity, such as replication management (e.g., state machine,
voting), leader election, transactional management, key management, and so forth. It
depends on the services provided by the CS module, and on the membership
information provided by the PM module.
Consequentially, the protocols implementing the layers described above all share the
topology awareness property. As such, they may run differently depending on their
position in the topology, although this happens transparently. For example, the SF
protocol instantiated at the Facility Gateways may wish to aggregate all
liveness/failure information from the site it oversees, and gather that same information
from the corresponding remote Facility Gateways. These considerations may
obviously be extended to topology-aware attack and intrusion detection.
4.4.6 Interaction Styles
In MAFTIA we intend to support different styles of basic interactions among the
participants. These interaction styles also assume topological importance, because
they can be combined to construct complex software architectures, but the possible
combinations are conditioned by the system topology.
Although the main goal of MAFTIA is to provide security in the face of malicious
faults, the MAFTIA architecture must also provide a versatile functional support in
order to be useful. Consequentially, MAFTIA will support the main interaction styles
used in distributed computing, namely:
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- client-server, for service invocations
- multipeer, for interactions amongst peers
- dissemination, of information in push or pull form
- transactions, for encapsulation of multiple actions
Client-server interactions can be implemented by two different mechanisms: in closed
loop, usually performed through RPC [Birrell & Nelson 1984], or in open loop,
usually performed through group communication, pioneered by Cheriton [Cheriton &
Zwaenepoel 1985], Birman [Birman & Joseph 1987] and Cristian [Cristian et al.
1985], and followed by many others. From previous works [Birman et al. 1991]
[Ladin et al. 1990], it is known to be difficult to scale service access when clients
need to be strongly coupled (for instance, when all messages need to be ordered).
However, there are a number of services, especially in large-scale systems, where the
coupling among clients, and between a client and the server, can be weakened. In
addition, techniques supporting reliable large-scale remote server access have been
deployed, allowing services to be easily replicated and invoked transparently, without
necessarily implying a degradation of strong failure semantics [Rodrigues et al.
1994]. Both approaches are easily implemented using group-based open-loop
mechanisms.
Another style of interaction is multipeer, conveying the notion of spontaneous,
symmetric interchange of information, amongst a collection of peer entities. This
paradigm appeared as early as in [Powell et al. 1988] where it is called multipoint
association, and also in [Peterson et al. 1989] where it is called conversation, a term
that we avoid in order not to cause confusion with a different paradigm with the same
name described in [Campbell & Randell 1986], and also discussed below. Multipeer
interactions are the kind of interaction one might wish among managers of a
distributed database, a group of commerce servers, a group of TTP servers, or a group
of participants running a cryptographic agreement (e.g., contract signing).
Communication requirements may be heavy in ordering and reliability requirements,
and a notion of composition or membership may be required (for example, to provide
explicit control over who is currently in the group). Again, the highly interactive
nature of the multipeer style of interactions prevents per se the number of participants
in real applications from exceeding the small-scale threshold.
Next, we have dissemination, which combines the information push and pull
approaches. Information is published by publishers, and is made available on a
repository. Message subscription can be implemented using two different alternatives:
the push strategy or the pull strategy. With the push strategy, subscribers just register
their interest in receiving a certain class of messages with the server, and the server is
then responsible for dissemination of these messages to the interested subscribers.
With the pull strategy, it is up to the subscriber to contact the server periodically to
fetch the messages on request. The number of recipients may be rather high, while the
number of senders will not.
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Finally, transactions provide the capability of performing multiple actions
encapsulated with certain reliability guarantees. There are three candidates for a
transactional interaction style — atomic transactions, conversations and coordinated
atomic actions — each providing different guarantees. Atomic transactions are a well
known structuring mechanism that are best suited to competitive interactions. Atomic
transactions guarantee the properties of atomicity, consistency, isolation and
durability (ACID). Conversations [Campbell & Randell 1986] are traditionally used
for cooperative systems and employ coordinated exception handling for tolerating
faults. Coordinated atomic actions (or CA actions) [Xu et al. 1995] [Xu et al. 1999]
are a structuring mechanism that integrates and extends conversations and atomic
transactions. The former are used to control cooperative interactions and to implement
coordinated error recovery whilst the latter are used to maintain the consistency of
shared resources in the presence of failures and competitive concurrency. Coordinated
exception handling is supported by distributed exception resolution algorithms [Xu et
al. 1998]. Given the possibly complex operations triggered in some of the applications
envisaged for MAFTIA, transactions may be coordinated in a distributed way, and
may be long-lived.
As said in the beginning, the several styles referred to above can be combined to form
more complex interaction styles. For example, transactions may encapsulate several
interactions built using the other styles. Note also that the extensive use of open-loop
client server mechanisms, multipeer interactions, replication, and distributed atomic
actions is yet another justification for the emphasis of the group-orientation paradigm
in the architecture of MAFTIA.
4.5 Services Model
C. Cachin, J. Camenisch, K. Kursawe, J. Müller, F. Petzold, V. Shoup, M. Waidner,
IBM Research, Zurich (CH)
We consider several distributed application services with high availability and
security requirements. These can be built on top of the services provided by the
Activity Support layer of the MAFTIA architecture described in Section 4.4.5.
4.5.1 Threshold-cryptography Services
Threshold cryptography allows a group of processors to perform cryptographic
operations securely even though a fraction (minority) of them may be unavailable or
may leak information to the outside. From the point of the cryptographic service
offered by the group, one must assume that they are completely under control of the
adversary and are called corrupted here. Robust protocols, such as those considered
here, allow the system to continue its operation despite arbitrary malicious behaviour
of the corrupted parties.
Building secure intrusion-tolerant protocols for groups requires several cryptographic
services:
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• Threshold Pseudo-Random Functions: A pseudo-random function can be
viewed as a random-access source of unpredictable coin flips (similar to a key
distribution centre that derives session keys from a master key). The master
random seed of all coins is maintained in a shared way among the parties such
that the adversary cannot gain information about it before it is revealed. The
value of a coin with a certain name is revealed only if a suitable majority
processes a request to flip the coin.
• Threshold Signatures: A threshold signature is a distributed signature scheme,
in which the signing key is maintained in a distributed way and never
assembled. A signature may be generated from appropriate signature shares
that are issued by a party when they process a request to sign a particular
message.
4.5.2 Fair Exchange
Fair Exchange protocols are useful in electronic commerce for digital content selling,
certified email or electronic contract signing. The fairness property ensures that either
both parties that wish to exchange items get the item they are supposed to, or get
neither.
One way to exchange digital items fairly is to slice the items in small parts and take
turns in sending them to the other party, thus reducing the other party’s entropy step
by step. For a more efficient approach, which is better suited for exchanging larger
items, we use protocols that need an additional party in the protocol, a trusted third
party (TTP).
One easy approach is that both parties send their respective item to the TTP, which
then forwards them to the other party. This approach makes it necessary that the TTP
becomes involved in every transaction. In the optimistic approach proposed by
Asokan et al [Asokan et al. 1997], [Asokan et al. 2000] the TTP is only involved
when something goes wrong, e.g., one party tried to cheat or messages were lost.
In a normal protocol run, the party which goes first, called the sender, starts by
preparing and sending a promise for the item he wishes to send. The other party, the
receiver, then sends back a promise for his item. Upon receipt of the receiver’s
promise, the sender sends the item in the clear, or the keys for decrypting the item if it
was sent as part of the promise. The receiver then does the same and the transaction is
complete.
The TTP is used to force a resolve of the exchange in case one party quits the protocol
prematurely, or to ensure a permanent abort. For these functions, the TTP needs to
have a database of transactions it handled together with their respective state. The
requests received have to be handled atomically per transaction.
For the TTP to be able to resolve a transaction, it must be able to substitute the role of
the player that quit. One way to enable it to play that role is to include an escrow of
the item to be exchanged in the promises. If one party wishes to resolve, the TTP can
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then open the escrow and give the item to the party. The escrow can be realized by an
encryption of the item under the TTP’s public key. Aborting via the TTP is necessary
because a sender might not want to wait forever for a promise of the receiver, and
therefore make sure that the TTP will never resolve the transaction.
4.5.3 Certification Authority
A Certification Authority (CA) is a service run by a trusted organization that verifies
and confirms the validity of a public key. The issued certificate usually also confirms
that the real-world user defined in the certificate is in control of the corresponding
private key. It links the public key to an ID by signing the two together under the
CA’s private signing key.
In the view of the service user, it works as follows. The CA has published its own
public key, of which all users are supposed to posses an authentic copy (how this is
done is not of interest here). When a user wants to obtain a certificate for his public
key, he sends the key together with his ID and some credentials to the CA. The ID
might consist of any information, such as name, address, email, and other data to
identify the holder. The CA then verifies the credentials, produces a certificate and
sends it back to the user. The user can then verify his certificate against his public key
with the public key of the CA.
In order to render its certificates meaningful, the CA will only issue one if the
credentials are valid and the user was authorized to get a certificate. The ID in the
certificate must belong to the holder of the public/secret key pair. It is in the interest
of the CA to have established a well-known policy for issuing certificates.
4.5.4 Time-stamping Service
Digital time-stamping services (TSS) are a means to assure the (relative) temporal
order of the creation of digital documents. They are a prerequisite for fully
digitalizing legal processes such as the issuing of patents. A time-stamping service
involves users and a time-stamping authority (TSA) that has made available some
system parameters such as a cryptographic hash-function. The TSA publishes
regularly, say once a day, some string (day stamp) in such a way that these strings
cannot be lost or altered. They could for instance be published in a daily newspaper or
be stored in a distributed database. To get a document time-stamped, a user sends the
TSA a cryptographic hash of the document. The TSA answers each request with a
time-stamping certificate. The certificate is intended to guarantee that the document
was published on a certain day.
The certificate service provided by a TSA ideally satisfies the properties of validity,
accountability, provability, security, unforgeability, and privacy.
In more detail, validity ensures that if the TSA is honest, a user will receive a time-
stamping certificate that is valid w.r.t. the next day stamp to be published.
Accountability means that whenever the TSA issues invalid time-stamping
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certificates, the affected user can convince a third party that the TSA misbehaved.
Provability means that given a document, a time-stamping certificate, and a day stamp
published by the TSA on a particular day, it should be possible to prove whether the
certificate is valid w.r.t. the document and the day stamp.
A day stamp is secure if the TSA can no longer issue valid time-stamp certificates for
a day after the day stamp has been published. Furthermore, given all day stamps, their
order can be uniquely determined. For the time-stamping scheme to be secure, one
must be able to determine uniquely the order in which any given pair of time-stamp
certificates were issued. Furthermore, once a time-stamping certificate is issued, the
TSA can no longer generate another one that appears to have been issued previously.
Unforgeability means that only the TSA is able to publish day stamps and time-
stamping certificates. In addition, privacy means that the TSA does not get any
information about the contents of a document that is time-stamped.
Digital signatures may be used for time-stamping, but the uncertainty about the
lifetime of cryptographic keys seriously limits the usefulness of this method because
once the TSA’s signing key is exposed in the future, all time stamps created by the
TSA lose their validity. The problem is only aggravated by the fact that time stamps
become more valuable over time.
Concrete protocols for time-stamping that are not based on digital signatures and
avoid this danger are described in [Haber & Stornetta 1991].
4.5.5 Authentication Service
The basic task of an authentication service is to verify the claimed identity of a user or
a process acting on behalf of a user. The user must present secret information that
identifies her or carry out a zero-knowledge identification protocol. If verification
succeeds, the service will take some action to grant the request, like establishing a
session or replying with a cryptographic token to be used. Often, the answer contains
a freshly generated, random session key as in Kerberos [Neuman & Ts'o 1994],
[Steiner et al. 1988]. Such an authentication server is also called a key distribution
centre (KDC). Communication between the authentication service and clients may be
encrypted and signed with the public key of the service.
The security assumption about the authentication service is that it acts honestly when
verifying a password or an identification protocol and never grants a request without
having seen the proper identification. The reference data against which the
verification occurs is assumed to be public but immutable; this is the case for Unix-
style password authentication and for zero-knowledge identification protocols, for
instance. But a key distribution centre based on symmetric-key cryptography must
also protect the corresponding master secret key.
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4.5.6 Mix Service
The concept of a mix network was introduced by Chaum [Chaum 1981] as a primitive
for privacy. A mix network can for instance be used to achieve anonymous
communication over the Internet. A mix network consists of some number of mix-
servers, S1, ... Sn say, each of which makes available a public key of a suitable
encryption scheme. A user wanting to send a message anonymously encrypts the
message and the name of its receiver under the public key of Sn. She then encrypts the
result under the public key of Sn-1, the result of which she encrypts under the public
key of Sn-2 and so on. The final encryption is then sent to S1.
As a single message routed through the mix network would be perfectly observable,
establishing anonymity requires hiding individual messages among a certain number
of similar messages. Therefore, S1 collects many messages before processing them;
we say that messages are processed in rounds. In the first round, S1 removes the first
layer of encryption from all messages, and sends them in a random order to S2. Then
S2 processes them in the second round, and so on. Eventually, Sn will receive the
messages, remove the last layer of encryption and send them to their final destination.
A mix network should satisfy conditions of robustness and privacy, meaning that if a
sufficiently large subset of mix servers is honest, then all messages are delivered
correctly and it is infeasible to link messages from the input to the output of a round,
guaranteeing anonymity.
4.6 Trust-based Verification Model25
B. Pfitzmann, M. Schunter, Universität des Saarlandes (D)
M. Waidner, IBM Research, Zurich (CH)
There are many different informal definitions of security. However, most people
would agree that requiring a secure system to be correct is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for it to be secure.26 In this section, we consider what aspects
beyond the usual notion of correctness are needed and propose a framework for trust-
based specification that is outlined in Section 4.6.1. Section 4.6.2 then refines this
notion by outlining our approach towards formal evaluation of cryptographic systems.
4.6.1 Trust-based Specification
An overview of our framework for trust-based specification is given in Figure 15
below. Rectangles and normal arrows denote objects and actions of computer science
                                                 
25
 This section is based on [Pfitzmann & Waidner 1994].
26 Safety specialists might object that their systems need not be “correct”, only fulfil some
important properties correctly. We regard this as correctness with respect to a special
specification.
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(ideally formalised); clouds and dotted arrows are necessarily informal. Some
problems and solutions are simplified. We strive for completeness with the design
stages; in concrete designs, some stages may be omitted.
Find concerned p arties and
p rocedures for agreement;
collect individual goals and trust
informally
formalise
formalise
Trust model
Sp ecification
   •  individual goals
   •  glob al sp ecification
Division into comp onents;
comp onent sp ecification
Imp lementation of
comp onents
design verify
imp lement verify
Figure 15 — Stages in the Design of a Secure System
4.6.1.1 Before Development of a Specification
At the beginning of the design of a secure system, the designers must somehow agree
• who the concerned parties are,
• what their individual requirements are, and
• how they will try to agree on common requirements.
These questions are largely outside computer science. However, security only makes
sense if this agreement really covers the interests of everybody concerned. Usually,
this step is missing in current security criteria. Only the designer and the future owner
of the system are considered. However, the design of a system such as a power plant
control or a payment system clearly concerns other people, too. The agreement is
framed in terms of “values” and “goals” [Biskup 1993]. Values are independent of the
system (such as the health of the people concerned) and goals are what the specific
system should achieve. This distinction between values and goals is helpful
intuitively, but we do not consider it further in the following sections since we do not
see how to formalize it (which was not intended in [Biskup 1993]).
Below, we show that considering the concerned parties separately is important not
only socially, but also in the security specifications. We use the term concerned
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party for everyone who has wishes about the system, whereas user means someone
who interacts with the system at its interface; system means an information
technology system and comprises neither of these people27.
4.6.1.2 Specification
Computer science starts, at the latest, when specifications are written. By specification
we mean a description of the system behaviour at its external interface, as
independent as possible of the internal structure that will be designed. We will not
dwell on the usual aspects of specifications, e.g., that there are specifications with
different degrees of formality and that they are developed in cycles. However, we do
wish to discuss general security-specific aspects of specifications.
4.6.1.3 Two-phase Structure
Most importantly, the specification technique has to reflect that there may be several
concerned parties, each with their own interests. Thus, in the general case, there is a
two-phase structure in the specification:
1. There are individual goals of individual parties.
2. These individual goals are unified and refined into a global specification.
The individual goals need not be in a bijective relation with the parties concerned — a
party can have many goals that it cannot immediately specify coherently.
Furthermore, groups of concerned parties may have more individual goals than each
of them has alone. For instance, with a communication system, only sets of at least
two users have the goal of being able to communicate.
The global specification should be free of contradictions28; if the goals turn out to be
contradictory, they have to be modified by discussion between the concerned
parties.29 Furthermore, a global specification is often assumed to be “complete”
[Dierstein 1991, Biskup 1993] (where this notion is left to the intuitive understanding
of the reader — necessarily, since the notion of specification is so informal that there
are several options). One reason to require completeness is that this makes an
informal review from a different perspective possible, at least if the global
                                                 
27
 In practice, this separation may be too restrictive since it does not allow the behaviour of users
to be specified. System administrators with fixed guidelines, for example, may be considered
as components following a given algorithm.
28
 Otherwise, no system can fulfil all of them.
29 This can be made less likely by assigning priorities to individual goals [Brüggemann 1993].
Of course, the priorities must also be agreed upon. Typically, preformalized goals for classes
of participants can be overruled by more specific goals.
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specification is in its own specification language, and not just defined as a
“completion” of the goals collected. Another reason is the nothing-else aspect
discussed below.
Note that we assume that the individual goals are formalized (at least in theory),
whereas in [Dierstein 1991, Biskup 1993], the formal process starts with a complete
global specification. However, a complete specification is a complicated object to
produce in one step, and we have found that the relation between individual goals and
global specifications is an important aspect of several research areas within security.
We will show that individual goals are important in combination with trust models.
4.6.1.4 “Nothing-else” Aspect
It is sometimes required that a secure system does nothing else than what is specified
[Dierstein 1991, Biskup 1993]; this notion, just like completeness, is also left vague
because of the vague notion of specification. This nothing-else aspect goes beyond
correctness, i.e., the mere notion of fulfilling a specification. It is important in some
applications, e.g., if one requires the absence of Trojan horses or covert channels, but
we do not claim that it is always needed.
4.6.1.5 Trust Model
Another characteristic step in the design of a secure system is to determine a trust
model. This is needed in addition to the usual specification because not every
concerned party trusts all components, all steps of the design process, and all other
users.
Conversely, one often speaks of a model of adversaries or attackers or threats. By
saying “trust”, we want to stress three aspects:
• It is a relation, i.e., it depends not only on the component or person that is
trusted or not, but also on the concerned party who trusts or not.
• The default value in the design of a secure system should be that something or
someone is not trusted. This does not mean that all untrusted components will
in fact be malicious but rather that we do not assume that they are not.
• Both malicious behaviour as well as accidental faults are meant.
4.6.1.6 Trust Subjects
In the real world, the subjects who express trust are the concerned parties. However,
the trust sometimes depends on the individual goal. An important example is graceful
degradation, where one has a series of weaker and weaker goals, and needs less and
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less trust to achieve them. Hence, formally, the subjects in the trust model are just the
individual goals.30
Note that the goals of sets of concerned parties are formally treated just like those of
individual parties, and so is their trust. However, in research areas with general rules
to derive the trusted objects from the parties concerned, one needs rules for sets, too.
For a global specification that is not just a collection of individual goals, building in
the trust model is more complicated: the subjects can only be the concerned parties,
but these are not usually mentioned in a normal specification. Hence one has to
introduce them for this purpose.
4.6.1.7 Trust Objects
Usually, a concerned party can express the circumstances under which it trusts a
component using the following trust criteria:
• Who will design / implement / verify / test / ship the component? (And with
how much care and which tools?)
• Where and under whose control will the component be placed?
• What physical and organisational protection will there be for it?
Note that these trust criteria should be applied to “basic” components, i.e., those that
concerned parties trust or do not trust as a whole — combining such components into
more trusted subsystems is another design stage.
4.6.1.8 Trust Degrees
In many cases, the trust model simply contains binary decisions concerning whether
certain objects are trusted for an individual goal or not. However, there may be more
degrees of trust, described by a combination of statements of the following types:
• Worst possible behaviour of untrusted objects, e.g.:
• One trusts that the computational resources of adversaries are limited,
or that adversaries cannot break a so-called cryptologic assumption,
e.g., factor 660-bit integers.
• One trusts that data may be observed in a component, but the
component does not deviate from its component specification.
• Characterisation of sets of simultaneously trusted objects, e.g.:
                                                 
30 Note that the trust model makes the individual design goals relevant formally, even if one has
a global specification too. The goals will have to be proved under these different trust
assumptions.
Malicious- and Accidental- Fault Tolerance for Internet Applications
83
• One trusts at least k out of certain n people (such as designers of
components).
• Quantification of trust, e.g.:
• For the reliability of hardware components: parameters such as the
mean time to failure.
• For the trustworthiness of a physical protection measure: the price an
adversary would probably have to pay to break it.
Additionally, trust may be a function of time.
4.6.1.9 Component Division and Implementation
Given the specification and the trust model (and assuming one knows the semantics of
those two together), one starts building a system. Among the many steps of such an
implementation, (at least) one is particular to security, the division into components
in the sense of the trust objects of Section 4.6.1.7. One determines the number of
components, the trust criteria that each component fulfils, and how they are
connected.31 If the trust model offers the possibility to design and place a component
so that it is trusted for all individual goals, one is lucky: one can implement the whole
system in this component without further trust considerations and thus use all known
design and verification techniques. (One may, of course, still prefer a decentralised
solution for efficiency reasons.) Well-known strategies for dealing with other cases
include storing data under the control of the party who has the primary interest in
them, storing copies in different components, or distributing the data with a threshold
scheme [Shamir 1979] so that it cannot be read by observing any single component.
Finally, the components have to be implemented. This will usually involve a division
into sub-components and several design steps. However, as soon as one has a whole
component in one trust domain (including the current designer and the tools) and the
whole set of requirements on its interface behaviour, there is nothing security-specific
to be considered.
4.6.2 Formal Evaluation
The goal of a formal evaluation is to verify that the system with given components
fulfils the specification with respect to the trust model. Briefly, each individual goal
has to be proved with only the given assumptions about the components. In particular,
if subjects either trust objects completely or not at all, only the specifications of the
former components can be used in the proof, whereas the other components can
behave arbitrarily.
                                                 
31 Note that objects like networks, which have their own trust criteria, must be considered as
components.
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We now sketch our formal model for cryptographic security and how it relates to the
general specification framework described in Section 4.6.1.
4.6.2.1 Security of Reactive Systems
The model for security of reactive systems [Pfitzmann et al. 2000a, Pfitzmann et al.
2000b] defines a formal comparison relation “as secure as” that compares the security
of two systems providing the same service. Intuitively, one system Sys1 is at least as
secure as another system Sys2, if and only if whatever an adversary can achieve in
the former, it can also achieve in the latter. This relation can be used to specify the
behaviour of a system by defining an idealised system providing the desired service.32
The real system is defined to be secure if it is at least as secure as the idealised
system.
Formally, a system consists of a set of structures for different trust assumptions. Each
structure defines a set of trusted components (formalised by interactive Turing
machines) as well as their user-interface. The model compares each structure of the
first system with another structure of the second system. In this comparison, the
untrusted components are subsumed by one adversary component A. The network
connections among the correct components and their connections to the adversary
component are defined by a connection structure G. The user-interface as well as the
ports that are not connected are connected to a component H that models the users of
the system33. These connected components result in a closed system that has no free
input ports. This system is called a configuration.
Using this notation, a system Sys1 is at least as secure as another system Sys2, if and
only if for any configuration of Sys1, (including an arbitrary adversary A1 and any
behaviour for the user H) there exists a configuration of Sys2 with the same user H
(but another adversary A2) such that the views at the user-interfaces U1 and U2 are
indistinguishable. Figure 16 shows an example of comparing two systems according
to this definition. The dashed line denotes the user-interface, the fine lines are
connections between components, the two views at the grey lines are required to be
indistinguishable.
                                                 
32
 Note that the idealised system is usually much simpler than the real system. Since it usually
defines the service by one trusted machine, it is also called trusted host.
33
 Like all other components, the users are state-keeping machines. This models that a system
can as well be “used” by another system.
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HH Sys1 ‡  Sys2
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M1,1 M1,2 M2M1,3
Figure 16 — Comparing Two Configurations
Note that this definition of security covers the intuitive notions of secrecy and
integrity:
• If one system is “as secure as” another, it is also “as confidentiality protecting
as” the other. If the adversary A1 can obtain any knowledge j , this knowledge
can be output to H. As a consequence, our definition requires that A2 is able to
output the same knowledge, i.e., is able to obtain any knowledge that A1 is
able to obtain.
• If a system is “as secure as” another, the behaviour of the two systems is
indistinguishable from the user’s point of view, i.e., an integrity requirement
expressed by some formula over the user inputs and outputs either holds for
both of the configurations or neither of them.
4.6.2.2 Trusted-host-based Specifications
Before actually being able to evaluate the security of a given set of components
formally, we have to translate the generalised specification as described in Section
4.6.1 into a form that enables formal verification in our model. This includes
translation of the system to be evaluated as well as translating the specification.
In our model, a system to be evaluated is a set of structures. Therefore, for each
different trust assumption, we define one structure as well as its user-interface by
removing all untrusted components. This assumes a binary trust relation since a
component either works correctly or else may behave arbitrarily.
A service specification for a set of trusted machines needs to be “translated” into an
idealised and usually non-distributed system providing the desired service. Again,
each structure of trusted components will usually be specified by one idealisation. In
order to enable efficient implementations, this idealised system not only specifies the
idealised service to the user but also idealised services to the adversary. For example,
a system sending encrypted messages usually does not hide the fact that a message
was sent. As a consequence, the idealised system should provide a service that
informs the adversary whether a message was sent or not (e.g., by setting a busy-bit).
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These two steps result in an actual system consisting of structures with trusted
components and an adversary. This can be evaluated against an ideal system and its
adversary using our formal model.
4.6.2.3 Tool-support for Evaluation of Complex Cryptographic Systems
In order to evaluate complex systems using formal methods, tool-support is desirable
to manage the high complexity. Since cryptographic systems are probabilistic (i.e.,
require reasoning about the probabilities of certain events), existing tools cannot
handle them. As a consequence, we cannot hope for tools verifying complete
cryptographic systems. For many systems, however, existing tools are able to verify
whether certain undesirable behaviour occurs at all or whether one system is a
refinement of another34.
To enable the tool-supported proof of complex probabilistic systems, we separate the
probabilistic cryptographic components from the deterministic protocols using them.
This enables us to use tools for proving the deterministic protocols while proving the
cryptographic components “by hand” (see below for an example). In order to show
that this separation is viable, we need to apply a composition theorem: In [Pfitzmann
& Waidner 2000], we have shown that if
• a system X built on idealised system SpecY is as secure as another idealised
system SpecX specifying the behaviour of X, and
• a system Y is as secure as its idealised version SpecY,
then the system X built on the (real) system Y is also as secure as SpecX. Intuitively,
this means that a system can be designed using the idealised versions of its secure
sub-systems without compromising security. In order to enable tool-supported proofs
of cryptographic systems, this theorem is applied as follows (see Figure 17):
• Lower-level (probabilistic) components are identified and proven by hand
against a deterministic idealisation specifying their behaviour.
• Higher-level components based on lower-level deterministic specifications can
be evaluated against higher-level deterministic specifications using tools such
as FDR / CSP [Roscoe 1998].
• The composition theorem guarantees the security of the composed system
(i.e., lower-level and high-level components).
For example, Figure 17 illustrates how the theorem can be applied to prove that
Certified Mail can be designed using idealised cryptography and shown to be secure if
the real cryptography is secure.
                                                 
34
 Intuitively, one system is a refinement of another if all events in the latter are also events in
the former.
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Figure 17 — An Application of the Composition Theorem
In the certified mail system35 depicted in Figure 17, one first identifies the required
cryptographic primitives and defines an appropriate probabilistic subsystem. Then,
one defines a deterministic idealisation of this cryptographic subsystem and proves
that the cryptographic implementation is as secure as its idealisation. Finally, one
proves that the certified mail protocol based on the deterministic cryptographic
idealisation is as secure as an idealised system for certified mail. If one can keep all
probabilistic actions inside the cryptographic module, the certified mail protocol is
deterministic. Thus, as a consequence, this second proof only involves deterministic
systems, i.e., tools can be used to support this proof.
Given these two results, the overall security of the composed system results from
applying the composition theorem as described above.
4.7 Responsibility Model
J. Dobson, University of Newcastle (UK)
In this section we discuss the structure of responsibility in an organisation. One reason
for doing this is that until the responsibilities are understood it is not possible to
determine whether an individual is intruding or merely carrying out some
responsibility of which the detector is unaware. (And this implies, of course, that we
may have to understand the responsibilities of the detector.) Another reason for
looking at responsibility structures is that it gives an understanding of privacy, in the
following way. The role of an individual is a statement of the responsibilities held by
that individual. Privacy is essentially a matter of role separation: the right to expect
                                                 
35
 Certified mail sends a mail such that a receipt is issued if and only if the message is received.
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that information generated in the context of one role is not interpreted in the context
of another role.
As will be seen, the definition we use of responsibility leads to a basic ontology of
relationships rather than of individual agents. As a consequence, we see a
communication system and its applications in terms of the relationships they support
rather than the individual activities they implement. This gives rise to the model of
inter-agent communication discussed in Section 4.8.
Together these two models relate to the intentional and extensional aspects of
communication: what the purpose of a communication is in terms of the human
purposes it is intended to serve; and how this is related to the physical messages that
bear this intended communication. It is our belief that it is the policies which dictate
the models that drive the choice of mechanisms, and the policies cannot be understood
without understanding how the human purposes have dictated the articulation of
responsibilities.
The concept of responsibility allows us to make a distinction between an insider
attack and an outsider attack in the following way. In both cases the purpose of an
attack is to cause harm. An insider attack is characterised by the fact that the intention
is to cause harm to those to whom the attacker has a responsibility not to harm (a duty
of care). Conversely, an outsider attack is the intention to harm those to whom the
attacker does not hold such a responsibility, as a consequence of which the potential
attackee must assume a responsibility to protect that which has been entrusted to their
care. A vulnerability analysis would therefore look at “the responsibility not to harm”
and “the responsibility to protect” as being distinct, the failure mode of the first being
an abuse of an existing responsibility whereas the second is the failure to discharge a
required responsibility. The main implication is on the nature of the records made
during the discharge of responsibility (for example, in order to show that the
responsibility was adequately discharged). If insider attacks are considered a threat,
there must be an obligation on individual agents to show that they did not abuse their
privileges during the discharge of their responsibilities since the keeping of such a
record is in their interests in the event they come under unwarranted suspicion.
Conversely, if outsider attacks are considered a threat, the obligation on individual
agents is to show what protection mechanisms they deployed.
4.7.1 The Core Concepts: Agents and Responsibility
The core concept in our way of looking at organisations is the agent. We describe
these as the primary manipulators of the state or structure of the system, but
essentially they are the people in the socio-technical system, although it is possible for
a machine to behave as an agent. What an agent represents is an ‘office’ in the sense
of a role holder, and this can be any size of group from an individual to a whole
organisation.
Following from the concept of the agent is the concept of the relationship between
agents. We call these structural relationships because we regard them as the
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skeleton of the socio-technical system. Every relationship between one agent and
another implies a conversation and the need for some sort of communication link
between them permitting the exchange of information. Structural relationships are
thus central in two respects: (i) in that they embody the organisational structure in
terms of authorisation and power structures, and (ii) in that they impose requirements
in terms of information and communication structures on any system installed.
AGENT 
ENT ITY
S t r u c t u r a l
Re la t ionsh ip
AGENT 
ENT ITY
Figure 18 — A Structural Relationship between Agents
The key to modelling structural relationships is the realisation that they are basically
responsibility relationships between agents. This brings us to the second core concept
in the modelling scheme, that of responsibility. We take the view that the function of
the organisation is manifest in the responsibilities held by agents, and that the
structure of the organisation is manifest in the responsibility relationships between
agents. The rationale behind this view will therefore be explained in depth as it forms
the central tenet of our conceptual modelling framework.
SUMMARY
CORE CONCEPTS
AGENT - a manipulator of the system
STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIPS - relationships between agents
• they are indicative of structure
• they embody responsibility relationships
• they imply conversations and communication links
• they impose requirements for communications and information
4.7.2 Responsibility and the Responsibility Relationship
4.7.2.1 The Nature of the Responsibility Relationship
Being responsible can mean either being accountable for a state of affairs without
necessarily any implication of a direct causal connection, or being the primary cause
of a result. We have named these two distinct types of responsibility consequential
and causal responsibility respectively. Consequential responsibilities are indicative of
the purpose of the organisation and the enduring organisational structure, whereas
causal responsibilities are dynamic in nature, being the relationship between an agent
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and an event. An example taken from the “Herald of Free Enterprise” disaster36
illustrates the distinction. The ship’s captain is always consequentially responsible for
the state of the ship, and in this case was blamed (with others) for the disaster
although he did not cause it directly. However, consequential and causal
responsibilities are often closely associated as in the case of the deckhand who did not
close the hold doors. He was causally responsible when the ship capsized, but he also
held consequential responsibility for the state of the hold doors all the time he held the
role of deckhand.
In what follows we are attempting to model the enduring organisational structure so
the responsibilities referred to throughout this section are only of the consequential
type implying accountability, blameworthiness or liability of the responsibility holder.
Models of causal responsibility, which in many ways are simpler, are for discussion in
a later version of this deliverable.
We define responsibility as a relationship between two agents regarding a specific
state of affairs, such that the holder of the responsibility is responsible to the giver of
the responsibility, the responsibility principal (Figure 19).
AGENT ENTITY
STATE OF AFFAIRS
RESPONSIBLE 
TO
RESPONSIBLE 
FOR
Responsibility
Principal
Responsibility
Holder
Responsibility
Target
AGENT ENTITY
Figure 19 — A Responsibility Relationship between Two Agents
The definition of a responsibility consists of:
a) who is responsible to whom;
b) the state of affairs for which the responsibility is held;
c) a list of obligations held by the responsibility holder (what the holder must do,
or not do, in order to fulfil the responsibility);
                                                 
36
 This was a famous accident some years ago in which a car ferry sank and many lives were
lost. Briefly, the salient facts were these: a deckhand forgot to close the bow doors before the
ship started her voyage, so that water entered the car storage area and capsized the ship; but
the captain had no way of knowing directly whether or not the bow doors were closed prior to
commanding the starting of the voyage.
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d) the type of responsibility (this includes accountability, blameworthiness, legal
liability, etc.).
The important point here is that responsibilities cannot be looked at on their own but
must always be considered as a relationship between two agents. The states of affairs
for which responsibilities are held may be at any level of granularity of the
organisation. For example, the responsibilities may be at a very high level (e.g.
responsibility for the adequacy of the service provided, for the continuity of a process,
for safety, for security, for the accuracy of information and suchlike), or they may be
at an individual level for a very specific state (e.g. whether a door is closed, or
whether a form is correctly filled in).
4.7.2.2 The Responsibility - Obligation - Activity Relationship
The distinction between responsibilities, obligations and activities, and the
relationship of activities to responsibilities through obligations is central to our
conceptual modelling framework. This is based on the precept that people execute
activities in order to discharge the obligations imposed on them by virtue of the
responsibilities they hold. These obligations effectively describe their “jobs” or roles,
and are the link between their responsibilities and the activities they execute. We can
choose whether it is more appropriate to model responsibilities, obligations or
activities depending on what view of the organisation we want to take and what stage
we are at in the system design process.
The distinction between responsibilities and obligations is apparent from the words
we use: a responsibility is for a state (of affairs), whereas an obligation is to do (or
not do) something that will change or maintain that state of affairs. Thus a set of
obligations must be discharged in order to fulfil a responsibility. As such, obligations
define in what way the responsibility holder is responsible, and what must be done to
fulfil the responsibility. Responsibilities therefore tell us why agents do something,
whereas obligations tell us what they should do. Although we make a clear
distinction between responsibilities and obligations (since this distinction is
particularly valuable in that we can choose to model either responsibilities or
obligations), it should be understood that responsibilities and obligations are closely
linked: every responsibility must have obligations attached to it and every obligation
must be related to a responsibility.
The distinction between obligations and activities is that obligations define what has
to be done rather than how it is done. As such we regard obligations as an abstraction
away from activities. Activities are defined as operations that change the state of the
system. Roleholders may (or may not) have a wide choice of activities that discharge
the obligations they hold.
It should be emphasised here that, although we have suggested that the activity –
obligation – responsibility sequence is progressively more abstract in nature,
responsibilities are not abstracted activities. A responsibility model captures more
about an organisation than an activity model. Responsibilities represent aspects of
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structure and policy as well as function, and are, for example, indicative of
commitment by the responsibility holder. We also focus on obligations in preference
to activities since an obligation model provides us with an abstract template of the
process within the organisation and avoids the trap of working from a model of the
system as it is instantiated at present.
SUMMARY
RESPONSIBILITIES
• Signify Structure: WHO is responsible to whom
• Imply Requirements: WHEN obligations are discharged
• Responsibilities are: FOR a state of affairs
• Obligations are: TO DO something regarding that state of affairs
THE RESPONSIBILITIES - OBLIGATIONS - ACTIVITIES RELATIONSHIP
• Responsibilities WHY agents do something
• Obligations WHAT agents must do to fulfil their responsibilities
• Activities HOW agents discharge their obligations
4.7.2.3 Delegation of Responsibility
The concept of the responsibility relationship allows us to give an account of the
delegation process in terms of responsibilities and obligations. We shall see below
that the delegation process is essentially a transfer of obligations from one agent to
another thereby establishing a new responsibility relationship between them.
Although it is common to speak of responsibilities being transferred or delegated, and
thus as having a dynamic aspect, the fact that a responsibility is a relationship
between two agents means that a responsibility holder cannot independently transfer
responsibilities to another agent. However, what may be happening in the case of
apparent transfer is that the responsibility principal reallocates the responsibility to a
new holder by destroying the relationship with the previous holder and establishing a
new one with a new holder. The case of apparent delegation of responsibilities is
accounted for by the fact that, although he cannot transfer his responsibilities, a
responsibility holder can transfer his obligations to another agent. The result of this
process is the establishment of a new responsibility relationship between the two
agents. The first agent becomes the principal of the new responsibility relationship
and the other agent is the new responsibility holder. We will now examine this
process in detail.
Obligations held by one agent by virtue of the responsibilities they hold may be
passed to another agent provided that this transfer is permitted by the relationship
between the two agents within the organisational structure. This process is illustrated
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in Figure 20. The top diagram shows the initial situation where agent A holds several
obligations associated with a particular responsibility. Even when an obligation is
transferred to agent B (lower diagram) agent A still retains the original responsibility
since this is not transferable: we will see in the next section how that responsibility
can be fulfilled. Meanwhile agent B has acquired an obligation relating to the state of
affairs for which agent A holds responsibility. Agent B must now also hold
responsibility for that same state of affairs, as well as agent A, because Agent B will
be affected when the obligation is discharged. However agent B’s responsibility is to
agent A who delegated the obligation; in other words a new responsibility relationship
has been created between them. The lower diagram in Figure 20 illustrates how the
process of delegation creates a new responsibility relationship between the two
agents.
Responsibility
Holder
Obligation 2
Obligation 1
Obligation 3
AGENT A AGENT B
AGENT BAGENT A
Responsibility
Holder
Obligation 1Obligation 2
Obligation 3
Responsibility
Holder
Responsibility
Principal
Responsibility
Principal
Responsibility
Principal
Figure 20 — A Responsibility Relationship Created by the Transfer of an
Obligation
An example of this process is where the captain of a ship is responsible to the
directors of the company for the safety of their ship. This responsibility to the
directors is retained even if the obligations to take safety precautions are transferred to
the crew. The crew then acquire responsibility for the state of safety in their
respective areas of operation, but their responsibility is to the captain and not directly
to the company directors.
A chain of responsibility relationships can thus be created as obligations are passed
from one agent to another, with each link in the chain being a responsibility
relationship between two agents. Within each individual responsibility relationship
both agents have a responsibility for the same state of affairs, although their
obligations differ. It should be noted that this delegation process will frequently be
implicit rather than explicit, and may be used to explain how the hierarchical
organisational structure and distribution of responsibilities has come about over time.
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SUMMARY
DELEGATION PROCESS
• When a responsibility holder transfers obligations to another agent he retains his responsibility
for the ensuing state of affairs
• The new holder also acquires responsibility for that state of affairs
• The new holder is responsible to the original holder
• i.e. a new responsibility relationship is created between them
4.7.2.4 Functional and Structural Obligations
So far we have only encountered obligations that are functional in nature. They are
what agents must do with respect to a state of affairs (e.g. execute an activity), in
order to fulfil any responsibilities they hold regarding that state of affairs. These we
term functional obligations. They are indicative of the relationships between the
agents and the state of affairs.
We have seen however that when an agent delegates an obligation to another agent,
responsibility is still retained for the resulting state of affairs. In order to fulfil this
responsibility the agent must ensure that the transferred functional obligation is
discharged satisfactorily by the other agent, and thus an agent acquires a new
obligation of a structural nature when an obligation is delegated. This is an example
of a structural obligation. It is to do whatever is appropriate with respect to another
agent in order to fulfil a responsibility, such as directing, supervising, monitoring and
suchlike of the other agent. This other agent also acquires a new structural obligation
of a complementary nature to be directed, to be supervised and suchlike (Figure 21).
For example if a director passes an obligation to a manager, the director acquires a
structural obligation to direct the manager in the discharging of the transferred
obligation, and the manager acquires an obligation to accept direction. In this case the
director holds a structural obligation and the manager holds both functional and
structural obligations (Figure 22). This can also be expressed as: Agent A directs
(Agent B accepts direction and executes activity), where the modal operator
“directs/accepts direction” is the structural obligation pair, and “executes” is the
functional obligation.
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Figure 21 — New Structural Obligations Created by the Transfer of an
Obligation
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Figure 22 — The Responsibility Relationship in Terms of Obligations
Structural obligations therefore come in pairs and are indicative of the relationships
between agents. It is these paired structural obligations that largely determine the
flavour of the structural relationships between agents at the role level. Very often
these structural obligations are implicit in the hierarchical structure of the organisation
rather than arising dynamically from explicit delegation. The distinction between
functional and structural obligations is particularly valuable from the point of view of
modelling organisational structure, but it should be noted that in reality both types of
obligations imply function in that both are realised as activities. Note also that no
distinction is made between entities and between relationships; for example,
obligations may be regarded as entities linked by a relationship as in the role
diagrams, or alternatively as relationships between agents (structural obligations) or
between an agent and an action (functional obligations).
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SUMMARY
A holder of a responsibility holds TWO TYPES OF OBLIGATION associated with the responsibility:
• FUNCTIONAL OBLIGATIONS are what agents must do with respect to a state of affairs
(e.g., execute activity); they are relationships between an agent and a state of affairs;
• STRUCTURAL OBLIGATIONS are what agents must do with respect to other agents (e.g.,
direct, manage, monitor etc.) to fulfil their responsibilities regarding a state of affairs; they are
relationships between agents in the context of a state of affairs.
4.7.2.5 Types Of Structural Relationship
Two categories of structural relationship can be identified on the basis of different
patterns of responsibility. Within these categories many types or “flavours” may exist
depending on the relative positions of the agents within the organisational structure
and their involvement in the particular context.
These two categories are the contractual type of relationship between organisations
or between distinct organisational units within an organisation, and the co-worker
type of relationship between agents within an organisation. The distinction is that in a
contractual relationship there is no concept of shared responsibility whereas in the co-
worker relationship the agents do share responsibility, although their individual
responsibilities may be different for the same state of affairs. In a contractual
relationship the responsibility holder contracts to fulfil the responsibility that is
imposed by the responsibility principal (Figure 23). The most typical example of this
category is the service type of relationship where the server contracts to provide a
service to the client. Note that only the server holds responsibility for the provision of
the service, and there is no concept of shared responsibility. Of course, the
responsibility principal may hold other responsibilities, such as the responsibility for
paying for the service provided.
Responsibility 
Holder
Responsibility 
Principal
RESPONSIBILITY 
Figure 23 — The Contractual Responsibility Relationship
In this type of structural relationship, the responsibility holder (i.e., the server)
apparently holds only functional obligations that must be discharged to fulfil the
responsibility, i.e., provide the service. There are however structural obligations on
both sides, implicit in the nature of the contract. The client is expected to behave in a
“client-like” way to the server: to request, acknowledge and pay for the service, while
the server should behave in a “server-like” way by providing the appropriate service
under certain mutually agreed conditions.
Most structural relationships between agencies at an inter-organisational level will be
of this type. Within a large organisation, relationships between departments will often
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be of this type. By looking at the contractual relationships between an agency
(organisational unit) and other agencies, we can ascertain what responsibilities are
held within the agency of interest and to which agencies it is responsible. At this stage
an agency can be regarded as a black box (a container that we do not wish to see
inside); we are interested in what responsibilities it holds, and not how they are
distributed within the agency. These high level responsibilities define the purpose of
the organisation.
The responsibilities held by such an agency are distributed within that agency by the
delegation process, either explicitly or implicitly. This process results in a network of
responsibility relationships giving rise to structural relationships of the co-worker
type. Co-worker relationships are distinguished from contractual relationships in
that both agents hold responsibility, although in different ways, for the same state of
affairs. The main type of co-worker relationship is that which results from the
responsibility relationships set up by the delegation process, whether implicit or
explicit (Figure 24). The agents are linked by the holding of structural obligations to
each other that are created during the delegation process. These paired structural
obligations are of the type direct—(accept direction); advise—(request and accept
advice); supervise—(be supervised).
Responsibility 
Principal
Responsibility 
Holder
RESPONSIBILITY RESPONSIBILITY 
Figure 24 — The Co-worker Responsibility Relationship Resulting from
Delegation
The nature of these co-worker structural relationships is strongly flavoured by the
relative positions of the agents within the organisational power structure insofar as it
affects the context in which they are working together. For example, a structural
relationship will have a strong element of power in it if one agent is senior to another
with regard to the specific task and can make and enforce demands on the other.
Alternatively it may be what we term a peer relationship if the agents are equals and
work together as colleagues without any element of enforcement. This power element
largely determines the character of the paired structural obligations, i.e., whether the
superior agent is directing, managing, supervising or merely collaborating.
A variation on the peer relationship is that of collaboration where there is shared
responsibility for a given state of affairs, but no responsibility relationship exists
between the two agents, since no element of delegation has taken place. In this case
each agent would hold responsibility to a third party but a structural relationship
would exist between them by virtue of working together (Figure 25).
Responsibility 
Holder
Responsibility 
Holder
RESPONSIBILITY RESPONSIBILITY 
Figure 25 — The Co-worker Relationship Resulting from Collaboration
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A model of co-worker relationships can be of particular value for the identification of
role mismatches and in general for checking whether the organisational structure is
well-formed. It can help in job design and generation of future scenarios, and in
particular can be used to check that every structural obligation held by one role holder
is related to an appropriate structural obligation held by another role holder.
SUMMARY
STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIPS
• Two categories distinguished on the basis of whether or not there is shared responsibility for a
given state of affairs:
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS
• No shared responsibility
• Usually inter - organisational
• Most common type is the SERVICE relationship: the server holds responsibility for the
provision of service to the client
CO-WORKER RELATIONSHIPS
• Shared responsibility
• Usually intra - organisational
• Most common is the DELEGATION relationship
• Strongly flavoured by the agents’ relative power in the organisation within the context in
which they are working, resulting in a spectrum of relationships ranging from extreme
inequality (POWER) to equality (PEER)
• Sub-type is where agents COLLABORATE, but there is no responsibility relationship
between them since they are each responsible to a third party
4.8 Inter-agent Communication Model
J. Dobson, University of Newcastle (UK)
In this section, we present a simple model of communicating agents that extends
classical models of message transmission in an attempt to capture the underlying
purpose and meaning of the communication. We define an agent as an abstract holder
of a responsibility. An agent may be an organisation, a work group, an individual or
anything else one chooses to assign responsibility to.
The strategy we shall adopt is, in outline, as follows:
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i) We shall define the abstract syntax of a message and of a communication. A
computer system can be seen as a means of enabling human communication
through the passing of messages.
ii) We shall provide a complete enumeration of possible types of failure mode of
messages and communications. Security analysis then consists of attempting
to identify all the instances of messages and communications in a system (this
is the hard part!) and analysing the defined failure mode for each instance.
4.8.1 Messages
The abstract definition of a message is: some text passed from a sender to a set of
receivers over a channel (maybe more than one simultaneous channel, as in
multimedia). No further elaboration of the primitive terms (in bold) will be provided
here. We shall leave the definition of communication until Section 4.7.2.
sender text
channel(s)
receivers
Figure 26 — A Message
This definition allows us to enumerate the possible failure modes of a message:
• The apparent sender (as seen by a particular receiver) might not be the same as
the real sender.
• The set of real receivers might not be the same as the set of receivers intended
by the sender: some intended receivers might not receive the message and
some unintended ones might.
• The text received by a particular receiver might differ from the text intended
by the sender.
• There are a number of authorisation failure modes, all of them being some
form of the sender not being authorised to send that text to a particular
receiver.
• There are a number of sequencing errors over an ordered set of messages:
message loss, message duplication, message permutation.
• The communication channel might block or might not have enough capacity.
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• The communication channel might suffer from a number of timing faults
(messages delivered too late or too early).
• For a message whose text is delivered over a number of channels (e.g.,
multimedia), there is the possibility of synchronisation errors between the
channels.
Our claim is that the above enumeration is complete, in the sense that any failure of
an instance of a message (as defined) in a system can usefully be put into one of the
above categories. The word “usefully” implies that sometimes there may be a choice
of which category to use. A formal theory of messages might be able to prove
completeness of the enumeration, though we haven’t tried.
SUMMARY
MESSAGES
• Text passed from a sender to a set of receivers over a channel
• Subject to the following failure modes:
• Message loss, message duplication, message permutation
• Mismatch between real and apparent sender
• Mismatch between intended and actual receivers
• Text corruption
• Authorization errors
• Blocked or inadequate channel
• Timing and synchronisation errors
4.8.2 Communication
Communication is a more subtle notion. The basic form of communication is an
intention (i.e., a human interest, that which is to be communicated) being mapped by a
particular stakeholder (the speaker) using a process we shall call generation onto a
set of messages, which are then sent to a set of other stakeholders (hearers) who use
individual processes of interpretation to reconstruct the original speaker’s intention.
Again, no further elaboration of the terms in bold will be provided. For example,
encryption can be considered one form of generation and decryption as the
corresponding interpretation.
But there is more to communication than that, since we have to explain these
unanalysed intentions. Our model is that the speaker’s intention arises as a result of an
observation of states of affairs in the speaker’s world, and that a particular hearer’s
reconstructed intention results in the hearer adjusting the state of affairs in the
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hearer’s model of the speaker’s world. This model may be computational, or physical,
or cognitive. Sometimes it may be the same as the speaker’s world itself, but this is
not always the case. We shall call this latter process of adjustment a deduction
process.
The following figure is a summary of our communication model. Note that it defines
three domains (knowledge, data, and information), for later convenience.
knowledge
domain
information
domain
messagesgeneration 
function
speaker
observation
state of affairs in 
the world
interpretation 
function
state of affairs in 
a model
intention reconstructed intention
data
domain
deduction
hearer
Figure 27 — Communication
This allows us to enumerate the possible failure modes of a communication, other
than those that can be categorised as message failures:
• The reconstructed intention might not be the same as the original intention.
Sometimes (but not always) this can be identified as a failure in generation
(the messages do not carry the intention) or a failure in interpretation (the
messages carry the intention but this does not get through to the hearer).
Sometimes the generation and interpretation functions might not be mutual
inverses.
• The original observation might be incorrect (not correspond to reality in the
speaker’s world).
• The intention might not capture the original observation correctly (“What I
said was … and this was mapped onto the messages correctly, but what I
meant was …”).
• The deduction process might be faulty: the hearer makes inappropriate
adjustments in the hearer’s model.
• The hearer’s model might be inappropriate: the hearer has chosen the wrong
selection of state variables, in constructing the model of the speaker’s world.
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We can now draw up a template that will be used for the categorisation of possible
failures in different domains, as follows:
data domain failures
message failures sequence failures channel failures
r e a l / a p p a r e n t  s e n d e r
mismatch
lost message blocked channel
real / in tended receiver
mismatch
duplicate message insufficient capacity
sent/received text mismatch permutation error synchronisation error
authorisation errors timing error
knowledge domain failures information domain failures
observation errors deduction errors
speaker intention errors hearer reconstruction errors
generation errors interpretation errors
generation not inverse of interpretation interpretation not inverse of generation
modelling errors
We can now indicate how we propose to carry out a vulnerability and threat analysis.
Vulnerability analysis consists in identifying all the instances of messages and
communications in the system in the terms we have outlined and using the templates
above to identify the various failure modes for each instance.
Threat analysis consists in deciding whether each vulnerability is exploitable, given
the domain knowledge or hypothesis that is being assumed, (a threat is related to an
assumption.)
At this stage it might be helpful to review the major kinds of error whose possibility
might be revealed by our analytical method.
The data domain is basically about security breaches. A security policy is a policy
over messages, detailing which of the various kinds of data domain failure should not
occur. Access control policies govern what counts as authorisation errors, data
integrity governs what counts as sent/received text mismatch, lost, duplicated and
permutation errors, and denial of service governs what counts as blocked channels,
insufficient capacity, synchronisation and timing errors.
But our extension to the knowledge and information domains widens the scope for
further classes of possible failure. For example, encryption and decryption can be seen
as particular cases of generation and interpretation respectively, and
interpretation/generation mismatch means that (for whatever reason) the decryption
key is not the one intended by the encryption mechanism. But there are other forms of
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generation and interpretation, such as certain operations undertaken on a database
application program.
Speaker intention error can occur if “accidental” errors of fact get inserted into a
database, and hearer reconstruction errors occur when the information presented is
misread from a computer screen (and let no-one say that this does not occur!)
An example of a deduction error is when someone who is perfectly healthy volunteers
as a control in the test of an anti-HIV drug. Obviously that person will have been
tested at some stage and recorded as having undergone a HIV test. This may later
cause someone (e.g., a medical insurance company) to make a misdeduction as to the
insurance risk represented by that person.
SUMMARY
COMMUNICATION
• Human intention mapped on to generation of messages which are then interpreted
• Speaker and hearer have models of each other’s worlds
• Subject to the following failure modes:
• Observation and intention errors
• Generation and interpretation errors
• Generation and interpretation not inversely related
• Modelling and deduction errors
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Chapter 5 Conclusion
R. J. Stroud, University of Newcastle upon Tyne (UK)
To summarise, this deliverable contains three main contributions:
1. A set of use cases and scenarios illustrating the wide applicability of the
concepts and models being developed by the MAFTIA project
2. A detailed discussion of the way in which core dependability concepts can be
extended and applied to the problems of intrusion detection and intrusion
tolerance
3. A set of conceptual models that together constitute a reference model for the
MAFTIA project and will guide the development of the MAFTIA architecture
These models and scenarios will be used to inform the work in the rest of the project
and will be refined during the course of the project to take into account feedback from
other work packages. In particular, the basic concepts in the reference model will be
formalised and used as the basis for some of the validation activity in work package 6.
Indeed, work has already begun in collaboration between some of the partners on
verifying some of the basic services identified in these reference models and
significant progress is being made. Also, the conceptual models will be used to guide
the development of the MAFTIA architecture in work package 2. Finally, the analysis
of intrusion tolerance and intrusion detection in terms of core dependability concepts
will inform the work on constructing an intrusion tolerant intrusion detection system
in work package 3.
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